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ARTICLES 
UNSTITCHING SCARLET LETTERS?:  
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND 
EXPUNGEMENT 
Brian M. Murray* 
 
Criminal record history information pejoratively brands those who contact 
the criminal justice system, whether they were guilty or not.  In theory, the 
remedy of expungement is designed to mitigate the unanticipated, negative 
effects of a criminal record.  But the reality is that prosecutors—driven by a 
set of incentives that are fundamentally antithetical to expungement—control 
many of the levers that determine expungement eligibility.  The disjunction 
between the prosecutorial mindset and the “minister of justice” ideal could 
not be starker, nor its consequences more significant.  Prosecutors, as agents 
of the state, can advocate forcefully for either the retention or deletion of 
such information, which, given the pervasive web of collateral consequences 
associated with a criminal record, can have a dramatic effect on the situation 
of an arrestee or ex-offender.  This discretion, as it relates to theories of 
punishment, prosecutorial discretion overall, the ethical responsibilities of 
prosecutors to do justice, and public policy interests, has been grossly 
underanalyzed despite the serious implications it has for both the 
prosecutorial role within the criminal justice system and for reentry efforts. 
While many scholars have paid attention to how prosecutorial incentives 
conflict with the theoretical responsibilities of prosecutors in charging, plea 
bargaining, and postconviction situations involving innocence, none have 
provided a theoretical framework focused on the role of the prosecutor 
during expungement.  Many of the complicated incentives that undermine 
holistic prosecution during those earlier phases exist during the 
expungement process as well.  But scholarly responses to those incentives 
are not adequate given the range of considerations during the expungement 
phase.  As such, this Article argues that scholarly discussions about 
prosecutorial discretion need to extend their focus beyond the exercise of 
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prosecutorial judgment pretrial or questions of factual and legal guilt.  Given 
that the primary role of the prosecutor is to do “justice,” this Article calls 
for increased attention to the exercise of discretion after the guilt phase is 
complete, specifically in the context of expungement of nonconviction and 
conviction information.  It offers a framework for exercising such discretion 
and, in doing so, hopes to initiate additional conversation about the role of 
prosecutors during the phases that follow arrest and prosecution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When should a prosecutor support or oppose the unstitching of a scarlet 
letter?1  Consider the case of Frank Jackson, a man in his seventies who 
applied for a customer service, telemarketing position with a large, regional 
insurance company.2  Unable to obtain and maintain steady employment for 
 
 1. See generally NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (1850). 
 2. The following account is a fictional scenario based on the author’s experience as a 
practicing attorney in both the criminal defense and employment law contexts.  The plight of 
the ex-offender is all too common. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Out of Trouble, but 
Criminal Records Keep Men out of Work, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/01/business/out-of-trouble-but-criminal-records-keep-
men-out-of-work.html [https://perma.cc/CM66-UGZE] (noting that men with criminal 
backgrounds account for about 34 percent of nonworking men ages twenty-five to fifty-four 
in the United States and discussing challenges they face to employment); City Employee 
Credits Alumnus with Ending 20-Year Nightmare, DREXEL U. THOMAS R. KLINE SCH. L. (July 
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years, and unemployed for the previous nine months, Mr. Jackson applied, 
interviewed exceptionally well, and was told he would hear from the 
company about a start date in a week. 
A few days later, the background check report sent to his employer arrived 
in his mailbox.  It came with a letter from the company, which cited Mr. 
Jackson’s nearly fifty-year-old, low-level misdemeanor assault conviction as 
the reason for not moving forward with his application.  Mr. Jackson’s 
conviction resulted when, as a teenager, he pushed someone during a protest 
of the Vietnam War; he served no jail time and his punishment was a fine.  
When he called the company to explain the conviction, the company’s 
representative was sympathetic but cited company policy against hiring 
individuals convicted of violent crimes, no matter how old and regardless of 
the fact that the position involved no physical interaction with customers.  
That was exactly what the last potential employer had told him, and the one 
before that, and the one before that. 
This time, Mr. Jackson sought legal assistance.  The attorney he met with 
explained that the insurance company may have violated civil rights laws3 
with its decision not to hire him and that the clinic could advocate on his 
behalf with the potential employer, but it probably could not bring suit due 
to the clinic’s limited resources.  Although federal and state law, in theory, 
protected individuals like Mr. Jackson, the statutes were untested and viewed 
skeptically by the judiciary.  Besides, a lengthy litigation would do nothing 
for him in the short term.  But all hope was not lost; it turned out that Mr. 
Jackson’s conviction was eligible for expungement.  Rejuvenated, he had the 
attorney file a petition for expungement on his behalf. 
Unfortunately for Mr. Jackson, despite years of personal rehabilitation, it 
took years before he received the expungement, which stalled his job 
prospects.  His petition was denied multiple times, largely due to the actions 
of an individual prosecutor in the jurisdiction.  First, the prosecutor balked 
at, and rejected, the petitioner’s filing—something the statute allowed him to 
do—causing Mr. Jackson’s attorney to seek judicial recourse simply to file.  
Second, the prosecutor objected to the petition, thereby requiring a hearing 
on the merits, which took three months to schedule.  When the date finally 
came, the prosecutor objected to the merits of the petition at the hearing on 
the ground that the state, and particularly the prosecutor’s office, needed to 
maintain records of past convictions for future law enforcement purposes.  
Even though the statute would allow the prosecutor’s office to retain the 
record even if it was sealed from the public and background-check 
companies, and despite Mr. Jackson’s otherwise clean record in the nearly 
 
22, 2014), http://drexel.edu/law/about/news/articles/overview/2014/July/epps-expungement-
project/ [https://perma.cc/U9T5-X8X5] (describing the story of an African American female 
veteran with a mutual combat conviction stemming from self-defense that prevented her from 
developing any type of career for twenty years).   
 3. See, e.g., Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions 
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMP. COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm [https://perma.cc/989G-9H9L] 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2018).  
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fifty years since his arrest, the judge denied Mr. Jackson’s petition for 
expungement.  It took another year, after an appeal, for Mr. Jackson to 
achieve the expungement necessary to obtain employment.  In the meantime, 
Mr. Jackson struggled to secure a job, shelter, and other basic life necessities. 
Mr. Jackson’s story is far too common for Americans with nonconviction 
and low-level conviction criminal record history information, especially 
younger Americans with criminal records.  In an age where the number of 
misdemeanor arrests and convictions is astounding and where employers and 
other institutions rely on such information to screen applicants, expungement 
can hasten positive reentry and the societal benefits such reentry reaps.4  
Interestingly, how prosecutors may and should react to expungement, 
especially when afforded significant discretion to either construct or remove 
hurdles for those pursuing it, has never been analyzed in depth.  The 
complicated incentives that drive prosecutors to act as staunch advocates with 
a conviction-first and conviction-preserved-at-all-costs mentality create a 
disjunction between the ideals of holistic prosecution and the reality of 
postconviction prosecutorial decision-making.  Beyond conflicting 
incentives, prosecutors have also been left without guidance on expungement 
proceedings—processes that have significant consequences for defendants 
and implicate the civil policy objectives of the state. 
Expungement,5 a remedy afforded in most state jurisdictions as a matter of 
constitutional or statutory law, furthers not only rehabilitation and reentry but 
restoration—for both the defendant and the community.  The broadening of 
expungement remedies provides ex-offenders hope.  While expungement is 
a constantly developing remedy in the information age, with much legislative 
progress still to occur and hopefully on the horizon,6 some individuals are 
 
 4. See generally Megan Denver et al., A New Look at the Employment and Recidivism 
Relationship through the Lens of a Criminal Background Check, 55 CRIMINOLOGY 174 (2017) 
(noting how prospective employees who receive a clear background check are less likely to 
be subsequently arrested).  For additional real-world examples, see, e.g., Raymond Owens, 
Berkeley Deputy Starts ‘Expungement Team’ to Help People Find a Job, NEWS2 (Jan. 11, 
2017), http://counton2.com/2017/01/11/berkeley-deputy-starts-expungement-team-to-help-
people-find-a-job/ [https://perma.cc/4SAN-GEN8].  Deputy Edmund Vice stated:   
We’ve seen several people who are trying to find jobs that cannot find jobs . . . .  I 
had a gentleman come and tell me he had started as a business hauling materials.  
He had started a business hauling wood chips or something like that.  He came here 
in a panic one day because that [an old conviction] was stopping him from getting a 
contract. 
Id.   
 5. For purposes of this Article, expungement means the “erasure or elimination of 
criminal record history information by rendering the information inaccessible, either because 
it has been destroyed or sealed from the view of certain individuals.”  Brian M. Murray, A 
New Era for Expungement Law Reform?  Recent Developments at the State and Federal Level, 
10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 361, 362 (2016).  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “expungement 
of record” as “the removal of a conviction (esp. for a first offense) from a person’s criminal 
record.” Expungement of record, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).   
 6. See Second Chance Reforms in 2017:  Roundup of New Expungement and Restoration 
Laws, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CTR. (2017), http://ccresourcecenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/Second-Chance-Reforms-in-2017-CCRC-Dec-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X8JH-7K9M]; see also Murray, supra note 5, at 362; Jenny Roberts, 
Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 321, 322; Recent 
2018] UNSTITCHING SCARLET LETTERS? 2825 
only a hearing away from restoration in the wake of suspicion (in the case of 
arrest) or retribution (in the case of conviction).7  This is especially true in 
the case of order-maintenance offenses or the prosecution of petty crimes.8  
Prosecuted at an alarming rate and arguably without normative justification, 
these are the types of contacts with the system that are not published widely, 
but are frequently reported by background check companies.9  That 
widespread reporting operates as unending punishment.10  And an 
examination of a significant number of state processes, undertaken for this 
Article, reveals that the prosecutor plays a significant procedural or 
substantive role in mitigating a criminal record’s effect in many jurisdictions 
across the country.11 
As such, expungement relates directly to the prosecutorial responsibility 
to pursue fair and just punishment on behalf of the community.  When a 
criminal record—based on arrest or conviction—has the dramatic effect that 
it does today, ignoring the ability of prosecutors to soften its effect, or even 
erase its existence, lets prosecutors off the hook, shortchanges defendants, 
and ignores the deleterious effects on reentry efforts and the system as a 
whole.12  Prosecutors in all jurisdictions face countless dispositions that 
allow for expungement, a remedy that inherently accounts for the symbiotic 
relationship between justice and mercy, the latter of which has not been 
adequately accounted for in studies of prosecutorial discretion after a 
 
Case, Doe v. United States, No. 14-MC-1412, 2015 WL 2452613 (E.D.N.Y. May 21, 2015), 
129 HARV. L. REV. 582 (2015).  A petition for a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court 
for Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448 (E.D.N.Y 2015), was recently denied. Doe v. 
United States, 137 S. Ct. 2160 (2017).  By the time it reached the Supreme Court, however, 
the case had mostly turned into a question of the reach of ancillary jurisdiction in Article III 
federal district courts. See Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192, 194 (2d Cir. 2016).  While the 
jurisdictional issue at the federal level is beyond the scope of this Article, the petition for 
certiorari suggests that the federal law of expungement may soon see changes.  
 7. Of course, expungement is not a panacea; expungement as a remedy is limited—
especially in the information age—and is only one aspect of the effort to further reentry.  But 
in an age where what is attached to one’s name has incredible repercussions for associations 
within communities and societies at large, expungement remains a crucial part of the larger 
puzzle.  
 8. See Andrew Ingram, Breaking Laws to Fix Broken Windows:  A Revisionist Take on 
Order Maintenance Policing, 19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 112, 113 (2014).  
 9. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not 
to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1656–58 (2010) [hereinafter Bowers, Legal Guilt]; 
Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 319, 
319–20 (2012); Shawn Bushway et al., Private Providers of Criminal History Records:  Do 
You Get What You Pay for?, in BARRIERS TO REENTRY?:  THE LABOR MARKET FOR RELEASED 
PRISONERS IN POST-INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 174, 174 (Shawn Bushway et al. eds., 2007); 
Michelle Natividad Rodriguez & Maurice Emsellem, 65 Million “Need Not Apply”:  The Case 
for Reforming Criminal Background Checks for Employment, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT (2011), 
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/65_Million_Need_Not_Apply.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZA94-694L]. 
 10. Alessandro Corda, More Justice and Less Harm:  Reinventing Access to Criminal 
History Records, 60 HOW. L.J. 1, 26–40 (2016) (detailing the stigma associated with a criminal 
record).   
 11. See infra Part II.A. 
 12. See infra Part II.A. 
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prosecution is complete.13  The expungement phase is an area where the 
prosecutor exercises discretion without necessarily having to make 
blameworthiness for a past act the primary metric of the prosecutorial 
response.14 
A prosecutor has the ability during expungement proceedings to express 
the state’s function as advocate of complete justice for all of the parties 
involved or, as others have written about with respect to other phases, to act 
in a quasi-judicial role.15  Prosecutorial recognition of this ability only comes 
after the recognition that arrests alone have the potential to regulate all sorts 
of human behavior16 and that convictions—regardless of their grade—
immediately enmesh defendants in a web of collateral consequences.17  Both 
contacts with the criminal justice system can cause nearly irreversible 
damage to the reputation of a defendant. 
Thus, while expungement is normally classified as a judicial remedy18 and, 
in some places, a nonadversarial process,19 the discretion of both the trial 
judge and the prosecutor is often at play.  In practice, judges often wait to 
hear whether the line prosecutor supports the defendant’s motion, or at least 
will not oppose it.20  And that is after the granting of a hearing on the merits 
of a petition, usually due to a prosecutorial objection.21  In some jurisdictions, 
 
 13. Interestingly, the comments to Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
speak of a prosecutor’s responsibility as a “minister of justice.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N, Discussion Draft 1983).  To my knowledge, no 
searching analysis has been conducted into whether prosecutorial notions of justice do, or 
should, include theoretical accounts of the concept of mercy.  The focus on justice is the norm, 
despite a significant history in the western philosophical tradition that recognizes a link 
between justice and mercy. See generally David Dolinko, Some Naïve Thoughts About Justice 
and Mercy, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 349 (2007) (detailing how understanding the relationship 
between justice and mercy stretches back to Aristotle).  Of course, discussions about mercy 
have occurred about the role of the executive when it comes to exercising the pardon power. 
See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics, and Collar Buttons:  Reflections on 
the President’s Duty to Be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483, 1485–86 (2000).  But an in-
depth discussion of the prosecutorial role as an advocate of mercy postconviction, within the 
American constitutional structure, does not exist. See infra Part III.A.   
 14. This concept has been discussed in other criminal procedure contexts. See Fred C. 
Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice After Convictions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 
171, 176 (2005).  
 15. See generally infra Part II. 
 16. Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 820–25 (2015).   
 17. See MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS:  LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2013); see also Brian M. Murray, Beyond the 
Right to Counsel:  Increasing Notice of Collateral Consequences, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 1139, 
1150 n.56 (2015); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter:  Defining Effective Advocacy 
in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 287 n.45 (2011). 
 18. MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A 
CRIMINAL CONVICTION:  A STATE-BY-STATE RESOURCE GUIDE 113–24 (2006) (surveying 
judicial postconviction remedies, including expungement). 
 19. See infra Part II.A.  
 20. The author recalls his time as a legal aid attorney filing expungement motions to erase 
arrest information for charges that had been dismissed, nolle prossed, or withdrawn.  On many 
occasions, a line prosecutor objected to expungement based on the alleged facts that had led 
to the prosecution.  Trial judges were often inclined to consider the objection of the prosecution 
based on the recounted facts, even though they rarely had been formally entered into evidence.  
 21. See infra Part II.A. 
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expungement motions do not receive hearings until the defendant has 
demonstrated to the prosecutor that the petition is devoid of procedural 
error,22 which, for the average, lay, unrepresented petitioner, is no small 
order.  The prominent role afforded to the prosecutor during expungement 
likely stems from a recognition of the multifarious role of the prosecutor, 
which includes acting as the arbiter for the extent of punishment exacted on 
behalf of the community.  Any understanding of the prosecutor as a “minister 
of justice” is incomplete if it fails to recognize the enormous responsibility 
that comes with exercising discretion after disposition.23 
Contemporary examinations of the role of the prosecutor focus almost 
exclusively on the exercise of discretion during the charging,24 bargaining,25 
and sentencing and conviction review phases.26  This Article seeks to pivot 
one step further to consideration of other phases after disposition.  It argues 
that theoretical conceptions of the prosecutorial role must account for the 
power wielded during a phase like expungement, regardless of whether the 
underlying prosecution resulted in dismissed charges or a conviction.  
Specifically, it claims that prosecutorial discretion relating to an application 
for expungement or certificate of rehabilitation27 is as important as the 
 
 22. See infra Part II.B. 
 23. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 174 (noting how the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards 
for the Prosecution Function address all stages through sentencing but stop without 
consideration for the variety of phases after disposition).  Professor Zacharias also noted how 
treatises tend to ignore this aspect of the prosecutorial job. Id. (citing BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT §§ 12:12–:32 (2d ed. 1985)). 
 24. See Margaret McGhee, Preliminary Proceedings, Prosecutorial Discretion, 88 GEO. 
L.J. 1057, 1058–59 (2000); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1536–39 (1981) (discussing prosecutors’ vast discretion in directing 
scores of law enforcement personnel and “orchestrating” grand jury proceedings); see also 
Lynn R. Singband, Note, The Hyde Amendment and Prosecutorial Investigation:  The Promise 
of Protection for Criminal Defendants, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1967, 1967–68 (2001) 
(discussing federal prosecutors’ considerable involvement in the precharging investigation 
and virtual free rein over the charging decision).  
 25. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 
50, 52–53 (1968); Terance D. Miethe, Charging and Plea Bargaining Practices Under 
Determinate Sentencing:  An Investigation of the Hydraulic Displacement of Discretion, 78 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155, 156–57 (1987); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale 
of Three Cities:  An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 504–06 (1992) (discussing the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion under the federal sentencing guidelines); Jeffrey Standen, Plea 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1471, 1473 (1993); Ian 
Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution:  How Mandatory 
Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
87, 91–92 (2003).   
 26. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 173.   
 27. Certificates of rehabilitation are judicially achieved measures of relief that represent 
that an individual with an arrest or conviction record has been effectively rehabilitated and 
that the criminal record should not inhibit, by law, that person’s attempts at reentry. Peter 
Leasure & Tia Stevens Andersen, The Effectiveness of Certificates of Relief as Collateral 
Consequence Relief Mechanisms:  An Experimental Study, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER 
ALIA 11, 14 (2016).  They aim to mitigate or prevent the collateral consequences associated 
with having a criminal record. Id.  A recent study suggests that they increase the possibility of 
employment significantly. See id. at 11, 20.  
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discretion relating to what charges to file and how to prosecute.28  This is 
because when prosecutors act after disposition, they have the capacity to 
bring the theories of punishment that underlie modern criminal justice full 
circle.  As the Ohio Court of Appeals announced in State v. Boddie29: 
We note further that whether to prosecute and what charges to file are 
decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor’s discretion.  A prosecutor 
should remain free to exercise his or her discretion to determine the extent 
of the societal interest in prosecution.  This discretion is no less important 
when applied to issues such as expungement.30 
In contrast to Boddie, the current emphasis in academic scholarship 
prioritizes the investigative and adjudicative aspects31 of prosecutorial 
decision-making at the risk of leaving consequential prosecutorial activity in 
the shadows.  The emphasis likely results from the common assumption that 
decisions about blameworthiness demand the most examination; hence, 
notions of professional responsibility remain tethered to the idea that the 
prosecutor’s obligations primarily relate to trial, or at least the determination 
of guilt or innocence.32  During these conversations, any attention to 
discretion postconviction typically focuses on the responsibility of 
prosecutors in situations involving factual innocence.33 
Even institutional reform and regulatory proposals, like those put forth by 
Professors Rachel Barkow, Bruce Green, and the late Fred Zacharias, focus 
exclusively on the exercise of discretion in assessing the defendant’s 
 
 28. State v. Boddie, 868 N.E.2d 699, 701 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007); see also Zacharias, supra 
note 14, at 173 (“Prosecutorial discretion is at its height in the postconviction context because 
legislators and professional code drafters have not focused on postconviction issues.”).   
 29. 868 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).  
 30. Id. at 701.   
 31. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:  Lessons 
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2009) (describing the prosecutorial role 
as adjudicator in the overwhelming majority of cases and arguing for institutional reforms that 
internally regulate prosecutorial behavior); Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, 
Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1, 46 (2012); James Vorenberg, Decent 
Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1524–25 (1981); Ronald Wright & 
Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 57 (2002); Fred C. 
Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice:  Can Prosecutors Do 
Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 59–62 (1991).  
 32. The fact that over 90 percent of dispositions occur as a result of plea bargaining has 
led to calls for finding a theoretical justification for an otherwise accepted practice. See 
generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969 (1992); 
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992).  
 33. Anna Franceschelli, Motions for Postconviction DNA Testing:  Determining the 
Standard of Proof Necessary in Granting Requests, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 243, 256 (2003) 
(discussing a statute in Washington that gives decision-making authority for postconviction 
DNA testing to prosecutors and the state attorney general); Judith A. Goldberg & David M. 
Siegel, The Ethical Obligations of Prosecutors in Cases Involving Post-Conviction Claims of 
Innocence, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 389, 395 (2002) (discussing the extensive discretion available 
to prosecutors after a conviction and proposing guidelines for ethical postconviction decision-
making); Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction 
Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 470–71 (2009) (noting that under the 
ABA’s model ethics rules, the prosecutor is responsible for bringing new exculpatory evidence 
to the attention of the court); Zacharias, supra note 14, at 233 (analyzing prosecutors’ 
obligation to “do justice” postconviction). 
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blameworthiness throughout the investigative and adjudicative process.  But 
those proposals, while instructive, need reorientation to the expungement 
phase for several reasons.  First, the distinction between the investigative and 
adjudicative aspects of the criminal process is not wholly applicable to an 
expungement proceeding.  Second, blameworthiness is not the primary 
concern during expungement.  Third, there is additional complexity 
underlying the policy behind expungement since expungement statutes, 
unlike other criminal statutes, create a cause of action rather than prohibit 
conduct.  And fourth, there is substantive and procedural variety across the 
fifty expungement regimes, not to mention the resource challenges at the state 
level.34 
Concerns about the procedural rights of the accused relating to guilt 
determinations, which animate Professor Zacharias’s work,35 do not arise in 
expungement outside of the fact that many expungement petitions are filed 
pro se.36  And, while informative, the structural proposals put forth by 
Professor Barkow to counteract biased and predisposed decision-making37 
do not neatly apply because expungement is not entirely adjudicative.  
Rather, expungement implicates both the investigative and adjudicative 
functions because law enforcement might find criminal record history 
information useful in the future, and because the merits of mitigating the 
arguably punitive effect of a criminal record remain an issue. 
As such, while many have recognized that “charging . . . is sentencing,”38 
not enough attention has been paid to how opposing expungement, or 
responding to other restoration measures, often leads to regulation beyond 
payment of the defendant’s debt due to the array of collateral consequences 
associated with arrests and convictions.  And the incentives that challenge 
prosecutors to be fair in other contexts manifest themselves in this one as 
well.  Prosecutorial responses to expungement intrinsically relate to the 
validity of punishment and to the regulation of reentry,39 thereby implicating 
the line between doing justice and pursuing and preserving convictions.  
Confining analyses of prosecutorial discretion to stages, where the latter 
pursuit is more visible but no more significant, is short sighted.  This is 
 
 34. For example, Eric Fish has argued for prosecutorial agencies to adopt clear policies 
identifying when prosecutors should act as advocates versus neutral administrators.  Fish 
concedes that adoption of his proposal is easier at the federal level given the available 
resources. Eric S. Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 244–67 
(2017).   
 35. See generally Zacharias, supra note 14.  
 36. Fish, supra note 34, at 258 (advocating for prosecutors to act as quasi judges when 
defendants do not have counsel).   
 37. See generally Barkow, supra note 31.  
 38. Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reform, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. 150, 171 (2012); see also Douglas Berman, Afternoon Keynote Address:  Encouraging 
(and Even Requiring) Prosecutors to Be Second-Look Sentencers, 19 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. 
REV. 429, 429 (2010) (“Through their charging and bargaining decisions, prosecutors now 
serve as what I would call ‘first-look sentencers’ who frame and structure precisely what type 
and length of sentence a defendant will face.”). 
 39. There is reason to believe that prosecutors should be more open to expungement even 
if they operate from “tough on crime” and public safety assumptions.  Clear background 
checks lessen the likelihood of recidivism. See Denver, supra note 4, at 196.   
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especially so given that a decision about the maintenance of criminal record 
information after adjudication can have a pervasive, pejorative effect on the 
livelihood of an arrestee or ex-offender.40 
Put simply, there are several reasons why prosecutorial responses to 
expungement matter for the overall workings of the criminal justice system, 
especially its fidelity to the punishment norms driving it.  Prosecutors can 
ensure or frustrate the punishment objectives associated with a criminal 
prosecution, further or subvert the regulatory and policy goals of the 
legislature and executive agencies, and act as a force for rehabilitation and 
restoration in the wake of retribution or suspicion that resulted in arrest.  The 
following set of questions indicates the range of issues embedded within the 
exercise of discretion during expungement proceedings:  When faced with an 
expungement petition, how should a prosecutor respond procedurally?  
Should the prosecutor adopt a nonadversarial position when deciding what to 
do?  Should the prosecutor advocate on behalf of the defendant, especially if, 
in the case of a conviction, the sentence has been completed?  In the case of 
an arrest that did not result in charges, or nonconviction information, should 
the prosecutor support expungement?  If not, what are legitimate reasons for 
arguing to retain nonconviction information?  How much expunged or 
shielded information should prosecutors be allowed to use?  Is using 
expunged information, even if allowed by statute, unjust or unethical?  
Should it be?  What principles, if any, should govern the prosecutor’s position 
on the expungement?  This sampling of questions—unasked to date by any 
ethical, scholarly, or judicial body—calls for careful analysis to decipher the 
blurry line between the prosecutor’s quasi-judicial and adversarial role in a 
context that is neither wholly investigative nor adjudicative.  An adequate 
theoretical framework for conceptualizing prosecutorial responsibility in this 
arena is necessary to help prosecutors pursue justice.41 
The contributions of this Article are both descriptive and normative.  First, 
this Article identifies the significant discretion afforded to prosecutors during 
expungement by cataloguing different expungement regimes across state 
jurisdictions.  Second, it juxtaposes these responsibilities with the incentives 
normally at play in prosecutors’ offices.  Recognizing that current scholarly 
 
 40. Appelbaum, supra note 2; Tina Rosenberg, Have You Ever Been Arrested?  Check 
Here, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/opinion/have-you-
ever-been-arrested-check-here.html [https://perma.cc/3C8J-QGEC].  
 41. It is true that an antecedent question might exist:  Why involve prosecutors at all in a 
decision that might be better left to neutral decision makers?  Some of my colleagues have 
suggested making expungement proceedings analogous to parole board hearings.  However, 
this Article’s primary purpose is to identify the current landscape and identify an appropriate 
response that falls within the existing adversarial system of criminal adjudication where the 
prosecutor holds most of the cards.  Given that expungement is largely a matter of statutory 
law grafted onto an existing adversarial system, it is highly unlikely that the prosecutor will 
be entirely removed from its procedural requirements.  Beyond that, there may also be sound 
reasons for prosecutors to remain involved:  they may represent constituencies that would 
otherwise not have a voice, such as victims, and they are, in most instances, the democratic 
representative for the community.  Even within this existing framework, however, there is no 
reason why state regimes cannot tailor prosecutorial involvement to the specific concerns and 
values of the community that the prosecutor purports to serve.   
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analyses of prosecutorial discretion are useful but ultimately leave a void in 
this area, it builds a theoretical framework for assessing prosecutorial action 
related to expungement.  Put simply, this Article shines a light on the 
existence, character, importance, and implications of the prosecutor’s 
unexamined expungement discretion. 
To accomplish this, this Article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes why 
expungement matters by examining the effects of criminal record history 
information and the scope of available expungement remedies to mitigate 
harm from those records.  In the process, it illustrates the significance of 
prosecutorial discretion by pointing to what is at stake for those who request 
expungement.  Next, Part II analyzes the various responsibilities of 
prosecutors relating to expungement in current state statutory schemes.  First, 
it identifies the responsibilities possessed by prosecutors in expungement 
regimes nationwide, focusing on the procedural and substantive implications 
of this previously unexamined discretion.  Second, it discusses how 
traditional norms and incentives in prosecutors’ offices suggest certain 
approaches to expungement.  Third, it analyzes how current understandings 
of the prosecutor as a “minister of justice” fail to provide guidance for 
prosecutorial discretion in this area.  Part III then proposes that many of the 
principles considered useful in other contexts can inform decision-making in 
the expungement realm to provide a deeper account of prosecutorial 
responsibility.  But it argues that conceptualizing the prosecutor as a quasi 
judge is crucial for adequate decision-making in the expungement context.  
This is because determining blameworthiness is no longer the primary 
consideration driving the process, and the prosecutor should be cognizant of 
the policy goals underlying a statutory remedy for ex-offenders.  This Article 
concludes with proposals for improving decision-making in this area; 
prosecutors can better design their offices to allow for execution of the quasi-
judicial role and statutes can clarify the role of the prosecutor in light of the 
policy objectives behind the statute. 
I.  WHY EXPUNGEMENT MATTERS 
This Part begins with a discussion of the prevalence of criminal records 
collected in the United States and the devastating impacts such records can 
have on the employment opportunities and other life prospects for those who 
possess them.  It goes on to discuss the history and merits of expunging a 
criminal record and surveys recent state law reforms aimed at improving 
access to expungement as a remedy. 
A.  Criminal Records:  Pervasive and Significant 
The overwhelmingly negative effect of a criminal record is undeniable.  
That effect is felt by almost one-third of Americans who possess some type 
of a criminal record.42  Mass criminalization has resulted in a class of 
 
 42. Rodriguez & Emsellem, supra note 9, at 1 (noting that over 25 percent of the adult 
population has a criminal record); see also Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest 
Records Rise, Americans Find Consequences Can Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 
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individuals that have been branded despite the commission of relatively 
minor crimes.43  Many of these offenders have been convicted of 
misdemeanors and order-maintenance offenses—such as disorderly 
conduct—which, given the complex array of consequences that result from a 
conviction, render full reentry into society nearly impossible.44 
Criminal records vary depending on the underlying conduct of the 
defendant who has been arrested, charged, and possibly convicted.  The 
volume of these records is overwhelming:  the FBI adds over ten thousand 
names to its database each day, with close to eighty million individuals in the 
FBI criminal database, which includes information related to arrests and 
convictions.45  Additionally, states have databases that catalogue criminal 
record history information.46  In some circumstances, states mandate 
dissemination of this information; in others, they distribute records freely or 
by sale.47  Private commercial databases make a significant amount of money 
trafficking in this information.48   
Arrest information is the most common type of criminal record and the 
most common form of criminal information eligible for expungement.49  
Sixty-five million adult Americans have an arrest record.50  The numbers for 
men in minority groups are equally staggering as close to 50 percent of black 
 
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-arrest-records-rise-americans-find-consequences-can-
last-a-lifetime-1408415402 [https://perma.cc/MVU2-KL4T] (stating that “America has a rap 
sheet”); Jo Craven McGinty, How Many Americans Have a Police Record?  Probably More 
than You Think, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-many-
americans-have-a-police-record-probably-more-than-you-think-1438939802 
[https://perma.cc/6QML-LGQC]. 
 43. Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 
1090–94 (2013); see also Roberts, supra note 6, at 325 (“The problem is thus better 
characterized as one of mass criminalization.”). 
 44. Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 9, at 1721 (noting how prosecutors, on average, 
decline to prosecute minor charges at a lower rate than more serious offenses, and that minor 
convictions can have dramatic consequences).   
 45. Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 42.  
 46. Jain, supra note 16, at 824 (“Every state now either requires or permits criminal 
histories to be released to noncriminal justice agencies, such as those that grant licenses and 
provide social services.”). 
 47. James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 U. 
ST. THOMAS L.J. 387, 395 (2006) (“[T]here are laws in every state mandating or authorizing 
the release of individual criminal history records to certain non-criminal justice government 
agencies—agencies charged with granting licenses to individuals and firms in diverse 
businesses, ranging from liquor stores and bars to banks and private security firms as well as 
to agencies that provide programs and services to vulnerable populations including children, 
the elderly, and the handicapped.”).   
 48. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT ON CRIMINAL HISTORY 
BACKGROUND CHECKS 2 (2006), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ag_bgchecks_ 
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LCF-YZBA] (noting that most private employers conduct 
background searches through private enterprises or through commercial databases that 
aggregate criminal records).   
 49. See Second Chance Reforms in 2017:  Roundup of New Expungement and Restoration 
Laws, supra note 6, at 6–18. 
 50. Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 963, 964 (2013).  By age twenty-three, 33 percent of “adults can expect to be arrested.” 
Jain, supra note 16, at 817.  For black and Hispanic men, that statistic is closer to 50 percent. 
Id. 
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and Latino men will be arrested by age twenty-three.51  And the FBI database 
mentioned above is approaching 250 million arrests.52  Arrest information is 
held by various government agencies53 and commercial databases54 in the 
business of proliferating criminal record history information. 
Misdemeanor arrests are the most common, and the number of arrest 
records is overwhelming.55  In effect, the vast majority of new criminal cases 
each year are misdemeanors.56  Law enforcement officers can arrest based 
on probable cause,57 and there are few procedural checks postarrest to 
prevent formalization of charges.58  These arrests often occur without full 
mindfulness of their relation to efficient and holistic policing.59  Rather, the 
predominant interests driving an arrest, such as restraining a defendant who 
broke the law, interrogation, gathering evidence, and clearing administrative 
items—such as warrants—are not entirely consistent with “harm efficient 
policing.”60  While these arrests are typically not publicized because they are 
relatively minor, they are also the type of criminal record history information 
that is stored and disseminated at a later time, which hurts the defendant.61 
 
 51. Robert Brame et al., Demographic Patterns of Cumulative Arrest Prevalence by Ages 
18 and 23, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 471, 478 (2014).  This number is greater than the records 
stemming from conviction because many arrests never lead to conviction. 
 52. Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 42.  
 53. It is not uncommon for various executive agencies, as well as the court system of a 
particular jurisdiction, to retain arrest information. 
 54. James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of 
Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 186 (2008) (“An internet search for 
‘criminal records’ yields dozens of companies offering, for a modest fee, to carry out criminal 
background checks for employment, housing, and other purposes.  These companies are 
somewhat regulated by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).”). 
 55. R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF 
STATE COURTS:  AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 24 (2012), 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/other-pages/~/media/microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/ 
csp_dec.ashx [https://perma.cc/YM2S-H3W6] (showing that misdemeanors significantly 
outnumber felonies in the criminal caseloads of seventeen selected states); R. LAFOUNTAIN ET 
AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS:  AN ANALYSIS 
OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 47 (2010), http://www.courtstatistics.org/ 
Other-Pages/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSC-2008-Online.ashx [https://perma.cc/ 
Y7AB-ZL9H] (citing 2008 data from eleven states and describing misdemeanor cases as 
comprising an “overwhelming majority of criminal caseloads”). 
 56. Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death:  Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass 
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1804 n.78 (2012).  
 57. Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). 
 58. Gary L. Anderson, The Preliminary Hearing—Better Alternatives or More of the 
Same, 35 MO. L. REV. 281, 281–83 (1970); Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury 
and the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. 
REV. 463, 468–69, 498 (1980).  See generally William Ortman, Probable Cause Revisited, 68 
STAN. L. REV. 511 (2016) (discussing ways to define probable cause).   
 59. Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 776–81 (2012) 
(arguing that constitutional rules regarding making arrests do not account for the complex 
array of interests related to crime control). 
 60. Id. at 792.   
 61. This point cannot be emphasized enough.  Some critics of expungement argue that the 
remedy is obsolete given the internet age and the availability of the information through news 
outlets or other websites and that First Amendment values cut against the remedy entirely. See, 
e.g., Doris DelTosto Brogan, Expungement, Defamation, and False Light:  Is What Happened 
Before What Really Happened or Is There a Chance for a Second Act in America?, 49 LOY. 
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Arrests have real consequences both inside and outside of the criminal 
justice system.  Noncriminal actors use arrest information related to a 
particular defendant or overall as a screening mechanism62 and to monitor 
and regulate behavior.63  In the criminal arena, arrest information affects 
various stakeholders.  First, arrestees face immediate, short-term deprivations 
of liberty that can instantly disrupt their lives.64  An arrestee might miss a 
shift at work, a deadline to pay rent, or the ability to attend a funeral.  Given 
that state prosecutions can arise through the filing of information,65 
prosecution is likely.  And prosecution might result in a conviction that has 
dramatic consequences on the individual’s life.  The mere process associated 
with prosecution can sometimes be more painful than the punishment 
inflicted postconviction.66 
 
U. CHI. L.J. 1, 23 (2017).  The first criticism assumes too much—that the average, low-level 
criminal charge makes its way into the public consciousness via the internet forever.  The 
reality is that the order-maintenance offenses that Professor Bowers has written frequently 
about are not the stuff of front-page news, especially the news preserved in perpetuity; rather, 
they result in the charges and convictions that appear on background checks due to the 
relationship between the reporting agency and the state.  Expungement at least prevents that 
appearance.  The second objection—undercutting First Amendment values such as 
transparency and notice—seems overblown upon a close reading of many of the seminal cases.  
The Supreme Court has endorsed a distinction between access and publicity that often gets 
lost in the internet age, when access and publicity are treated as synonymous. See DOJ v. 
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 776–80 (1989) (holding that the 
release of FBI rap sheet information to third parties could constitute an unwarranted invasion 
of privacy and thus was exempt from Freedom of Information Act disclosure requirements); 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580–81 (1980) (stating that absent an 
articulated overriding interest, criminal trials must be open to the public); Nixon v. Warner 
Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 608–10 (1978) (holding that the district court was not required 
to release tape recordings admitted into evidence during the Watergate investigation to the 
media).  As these cases demonstrate, the Court has never held that imposing some burden on 
a party in order to obtain information is per se constitutionally problematic, nor has it taken 
issue with requiring individuals to visit the courthouse, dig through mounds of paper, and 
search tons of records in order to obtain criminal record history information.  But even if the 
modern-day Court were to take this view, it would have to grapple with the argument that 
there may be a competing constitutional interest in reintegration and reentry, or even 
reputation, that requires careful balancing. See, e.g., Joy Radice, The Reintegrative State, 66 
EMORY L.J. 1315, 1332–50 (2017) (arguing that states have a strong interest, if not an 
obligation, to reintegrate people with criminal convictions back into society). 
 62. Jain, supra note 16, at 810 (“A number of actors outside the criminal justice system, 
such as immigration enforcement officials, public housing authorities, public benefits 
administrators, employers, licensing authorities, social services providers, and education 
officials, among others, routinely receive and review arrest information.  These actors use 
arrest information for their own purposes and in ways that are distinct from the aims of the 
criminal justice system.”).   
 63. Id. at 812 (“Arrests provide a way to monitor individuals, to evaluate whether the 
arrested individual falls into a regulatory priority, and ultimately to determine whether to 
modify a preexisting social or legal arrangement.”).   
 64. Id. at 842–43 (describing how the defendant might have practical interests, such as 
childcare, immediately stalled due to being in custody).   
 65. James R. Beck, Note, Initiation of Prosecution by Information—Leave of Court or 
Preliminary Examination?, 25 MONT. L. REV. 135, 135–36 (1963). 
 66. MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 30–31 (1992).   
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Arrests also affect communities by shaping their perceptions of justice.67  
Statistics demonstrate that arrests might result in disproportionate harm to 
minorities.68  Arrests also have serious financial costs for the community 
because they initiate a series of procedures postarrest that occur before 
prosecution even begins.69  Those commitments cost money and take time 
away from other law enforcement efforts. 
Arrests also implicate actors in the civil context.  Sharing arrest 
information allows noncriminal actors to pursue alternative, noncriminal 
regulatory goals, especially in an area of the law such as immigration.70  
Immigration Customs and Enforcement (ICE) uses arrests to identify 
immigrants for removal proceedings.71  Public housing authorities use arrest 
information to make eligibility determinations and identify whether leases 
should be renewed.72  In the employment context, employers routinely use 
arrest information to screen applicants.73  This is one reason why 
municipalities throughout the country have adopted “ban the box” ordinances 
restricting an employer’s ability to inquire into a job applicant’s criminal 
 
 67. The lawfulness, utility, or wisdom of an arrest has the capacity to affect how 
individuals and communities perceive the administration of justice. See Jacinta M. Gau & Rod 
K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and Order Maintenance Policing:  A Study of Inner-City 
Young Men’s Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, 27 JUST. Q. 255, 272 (2010).  
 68. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration 
in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004) (discussing how mass 
imprisonment harms African American communities).  
 69. Jain, supra note 16, at 823.   
 70. Id. at 826–29 (describing how immigration authorities and agencies use arrest 
information to enforce immigration norms and rules).   
 71. Secure Communities:  Get the Facts, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20140910121059/http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/get-
the-facts.htm (“Through April 30, 2015, more than 283,000 convicted criminal aliens were 
removed from the United States after identification through Secure Communities.”); see also 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-708, SECURE COMMUNITIES:  CRIMINAL ALIEN 
REMOVALS INCREASED, BUT TECHNOLOGY PLANNING IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED 14 (2012), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592415.pdf [https://perma.cc/FMH2-H795] (stating that 
approximately 20 percent of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) removals in 2010 
and the early part of 2011 were attributed to Secure Communities).  It is quite common for 
ICE to detain an individual upon learning of an arrest within the state system. Immigration 
Detainers, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrants-rights/ice-and-border-patrol-
abuses/immigration-detainers [https://perma.cc/5ZYX-C27G] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) 
(“An ICE detainer is a written request that a local jail or other law enforcement agency detain 
an individual for an additional 48 hours (excluding weekends and holidays) after his or her 
release date in order to provide ICE agents extra time to decide whether to take the individual 
into federal custody for removal purposes.”).  
 72. Jain, supra note 16, at 835 (“[C]ontact with the criminal justice system serves as the 
first step in a screening process that may lead to eviction.”).  Housing authorities use arrests 
to see whether particular tenants or those they host might be engaging in activity that would 
lead to ineligibility. Id.  
 73. See Background Checking:  Conducting Criminal Background Checks, SOC’Y FOR 
HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.slideshare.net/shrm/background-check-
criminal [https://perma.cc/X6BM-BHFY] (slide three); Memorandum from Brian P. Ritchie, 
Office of Inspector Gen., to Marilyn Tavenner, Ctr. For Medicaid & Medicare Servs., State 
Requirements for Conducting Background Checks on Home Health Agency Employees (May 
29, 2014), http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-07-14-00131.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6MK-
RBSD]. 
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past, although their utility has been questioned.74  Employers also use arrest 
information to monitor the activities of employees—both on and off the job.75  
Locating the information allows employers to engage in investigations 
themselves, which at times can lead to unnecessary adverse employment 
actions.76  Finally, many licensing agencies use arrest information to inhibit 
entry into a profession or trade requiring a license.77  In short, arrest 
information allows for coordination between levels of government to enforce 
immigration goals and public policy measures.78 
While an arrest can result in many problems, having a conviction is 
essentially catastrophic given the number of disadvantages that could 
automatically or potentially result.  In 2010, about 10 percent of adult males 
and 25 percent of black males in the population had a felony conviction.79  
Immediate consequences, often deemed “collateral,” can include the loss of 
civil rights, such as voting; eligibility for public privileges and benefits, such 
as public housing; and the ability to find gainful employment given the social 
stigma that comes with a conviction.80  In fact, many states—as well as the 
federal government—have enacted statutes and regulations expressly 
prohibiting ex-offenders from obtaining certain jobs.81  Those prohibitions 
 
 74. Beth Avery & Phil Hernandez, Ban the Box:  U.S. Cities, Counties, and States Adopt 
Fair Hiring Policies, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT (Feb. 8, 2018), 
http://www.nelp.org/publication/ban-the-box-fair-chance-hiring-state-and-local-guide/ 
[https://perma.cc/C7RS-Y9SU] (noting how thirty states have adopted “ban the box” laws or 
policies).  Some have argued that ban the box measures are not necessarily the most effective 
in mitigating the effect of arrest records. See, e.g., Amanda Y. Agan & Sonja B. Starr, Ban the 
Box, Criminal Records, and Statistical Discrimination:  A Field Experiment (Univ. of Mich. 
Law & Econ. Research, Paper No. 16-012, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2795795 [https://perma.cc/JLJ9-HWTT]. 
 75. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 915.002, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:  
CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER 
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 6 (2012), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/ 
guidance/upload/arrest_conviction.pdf [https://perma.cc/989G-9H9L] (“In one survey, a total 
of 92% of responding employers stated that they subjected all or some of their job candidates 
to criminal background checks.  Employers have reported that their use of criminal history 
information is related to ongoing efforts to combat theft and fraud, as well as heightened 
concerns about workplace violence and potential liability for negligent hiring.  Employers also 
cite federal laws as well as state and local laws as reasons for using criminal background 
checks.” (footnotes omitted)); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 
937 (2003) (discussing the effect of a criminal record on barriers to employment). 
 76. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, COLLATERAL DAMAGE:  AMERICA’S 
FAILURE TO FORGIVE OR FORGET IN THE WAR ON CRIME 36–37 (2014), 
https://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=33203&libID=33172 
[https://perma.cc/7TP3-GDZT] (discussing the role of negligent-hiring torts in background 
checks).   
 77. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 75, at 12 (“An arrest, however, 
may in some circumstances trigger an inquiry into whether the conduct underlying the arrest 
justifies an adverse employment action.”). 
 78. Jain, supra note 16, at 830–32. 
 79. Appelbaum, supra note 2. 
 80. Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as Punishment:  A Critical Guide to Padilla 
v. Kentucky, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2010, at 21, 22. 
 81. See CMTY. LEGAL SERVS. OF PHILA., LEGAL REMEDIES AND LIMITATIONS:  
EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS IN PENNSYLVANIA 5–11 (2016), 
https://clsphila.org/sites/default/files/issues/Legal%20Remedies%20and%20Limitations%20
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typically exist in tandem with statutes that impliedly allow consideration of 
arrest and conviction records by employers, without much restriction.82  In 
terms of public benefits, convictions render many individuals ineligible for 
welfare assistance,83 medical benefits,84 and unemployment benefits.85  A 
conviction may also affect eligibility for public housing.86  While more 
consequences of having a conviction could be mentioned, the literature 
describing such consequences is voluminous and need not be repeated here.87 
 
on%20the%20Employment%20of%20People%20with%20Criminal%20Records%20in%20
Pennsylvania-%20May%202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/853L-QWAP] (noting how individuals 
with certain types of convictions cannot seek employment at airports, banks, insurance 
companies, long-term care facilities, and schools, or even at certain security positions); 
Roberts, supra note 17, at 287 n.41. 
 82. See generally State Laws and Their Impact on Use of Criminal Records for 
Employment Purposes, GEN. INFO. SERVICES (2007), https://hr.4act.com/documents/State_ 
Laws_and_Their_Impact_on_Use_of_Criminal_Records_for_Emplo.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
2L7W-Z6HZ].   
 83. 21 U.S.C. § 862a(1)(A) (2012). 
 84. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(4), (b)(3) (2012). 
 85. See, e.g., 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 802(g) (2018); see also id. § 871(b) (noting the 
implications of making false representations when applying for unemployment benefits or 
changes in those benefits). 
 86. See 42 U.S.C. § 13662(a) (2012); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 780-167(b) (2018) (detailing 
the impact of a final criminal conviction in a drug-related offense on eviction proceedings). 
 87. Murray, supra note 17, at 1157–58 (citing a study regarding systemic literacy of 
collateral consequences); Roberts, supra note 17, at 287 nn.40–45.  See generally LOVE ET AL., 
supra note 17; National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, COUNCIL ST. 
GOVERNMENTS JUST. CTR., https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/ [https://perma.cc/ 
D6P6-B3VV] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
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When disseminated, criminal record history information has a punitive88 
and regulatory effect89 that is extremely detrimental.90  Thus, prosecutorial 
decisions in this context implicate the exaction of punishment and the 
regulation of future conduct by former defendants.  As such, the treatment of 
criminal records after prosecution is inherently part of the prosecutorial 
function.  But to adequately gauge the prosecutorial role in this regard, a 
discussion of the purpose of expungement, the current state of the law, and 
how these two factors relate to the underlying purposes of the criminal justice 
system and punishment is in order. 
B.  Expungement as a Remedy 
Expungement law has been developing for nearly eight decades.91  Its 
primary focus is restoration; the elimination or sealing92 of a criminal record 
removes information from the public’s reach or eyesight while permitting the 
ex-offender to carve a new identity—or at least to cover up the branding that 
has occurred so that only a select few, in limited circumstances, can unveil 
 
 88. See, e.g., Sarah B. Berson, Beyond the Sentence—Understanding Collateral 
Consequences, NAT’L INST. JUST., Sept. 2013, at 25, 26; Chin & Love, supra note 80, at 22; 
Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile:  The Need for Restrictions on Collateral 
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 153–54 (1999) (arguing that 
collateral consequences are “de facto punishment”); Alec Ewald & Christopher Uggen, The 
Collateral Effects of Imprisonment on Prisoners, Their Families, and Communities, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 83, 93–94 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. 
Reitz eds., 2012); Wayne A. Logan, Populism and Punishment:  Sex Offender Registration 
and Community Notification in the Courts, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2011, at 37, 38–39 (labeling 
Smith v. Doe, in which the Supreme Court held that Alaska’s sex-offender registry law was 
nonpunitive, a “Dubious Doctrine”); McGregor Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word:  A 
Criminal Defense Attorney’s Guide to Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy Strategy, 
36 U. TOL. L. REV. 479, 479 n.2 (2005) (“[C]alling these consequences ‘collateral’ is merely a 
legal fiction—the person experiences the consequences as punishments regardless of the 
label.”); Andrea E. Yang, Comment, Historical Criminal Punishments, Punitive Aims and Un-
“Civil” Post-Custody Sanctions on Sex Offenders:  Reviving the Ex Post Facto Clause as a 
Bulwark of Personal Security and Private Rights, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1299, 1322–23 (2007). 
 89. In recent years, there has been a dispute about whether collateral consequences should 
be understood as forms of punishment or as civil effects of an arrest or conviction.  While 
most commentators have argued forcefully for recognizing them as extensions of punishment, 
given their incapacitating effect, collateral consequences might be considered regulatory 
measures as well because they essentially restrict behavior of ex-offenders by classifying them 
according to risk potential. Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive 
State, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 301, 303 (2015) (arguing for understanding collateral 
consequences as regulatory measures assessing future risk rather than penal measures 
involving judgments of culpability).  While an interesting philosophical discussion in its own 
right, whether either side is correct is probably immaterial for the argument in this Article 
given that expungement as a remedy lies at the intersection of how criminal records implicate 
criminal and civil policy objectives.   
 90. Corda, supra note 10, at 15–17. 
 91. Fred C. Zacharias, The Uses and Abuses of Convictions Set Aside Under the Federal 
Youth Corrections Act, 1981 DUKE L.J. 477, 482–84 (discussing juvenile expungement 
measures as responses to the desire to rehabilitate youth offenders).   
 92. Expungement, while in effect resulting in the elimination of the information from the 
public eye, can either mean full destruction of the record or merely hiding it from the public 
while still granting access to certain parties, such as law enforcement. Murray, supra note 5, 
at 362.   
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it.93  In order to fully situate prosecutorial responsibility as it relates to 
expungement, the following Parts articulate the nature and purposes of 
expungement, the current state of the law, and the prospects for future 
developments. 
1.  History, Theory, and Purposes 
Lord Coke said that “punishment can terminate, [but] guilt endures 
forever.”94  The policy behind expungement is to provide offenders another 
chance95 at building an identity by allowing them to move on from the past.96  
There is debate over its philosophical merits.  On the one hand, the policy 
objectives behind the remedy are noble:  ex-offenders are offered an 
opportunity at restoration, the first step of which is rebuilding their name.97  
Sympathetic policymakers probably contributed to the large-scale, relatively 
uncritical welcoming of expungement as a remedy.98  At the same time, 
erasing or shielding information arguably smacks of Orwellian whitewashing 
and undermines the public’s capacity to know and act on the truth.99  As such, 
expungement implicates certain constitutional norms, such as freedom of 
 
 93. This is why some laws consider expungement to be the erasure or elimination of 
information whereas others define expungement as the “sealing” of information. Id. at 369–
73.  
 94. Barry M. Portnoy, Employment of Former Criminals, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 306, 306 
(1970) (quoting Brown v. Crashaw (1614) 80 Eng. Rep. 1028, 1028 (KB)).   
 95. State v. N.W., 747 A.2d 819, 823 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (discussing how 
the purpose of the expungement statute was to provide an offender with a “second chance”).   
 96. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1417 (2017) (restoring the privileges and rights of 
an individual and directing that the record “shall not affect any of his or her civil rights or 
liberties”); AARON NUSSBAUM, FIRST OFFENDERS—A SECOND CHANCE 24 (1956) (“A theory 
of law which withholds the finality of forgiveness after punishment is ended is as indefensible 
in logic as it is on moral grounds.”); Aidan R. Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication 
Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders:  A Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 162.  
 97. JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 113–14 (2015) (“The purpose of 
this policy . . . is to encourage rehabilitation and to recognize that a previously convicted 
offender has succeeded in turning his life around.”); Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over 
with a Clean Slate:  In Praise of a Forgotten Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1705, 1708 (2003) (noting how criminal offenders are subject to lifelong prejudice 
after formal punishment has ended).   
 98. See Bernard Kogon & Donald L. Loughery Jr., Sealing and Expungement of Criminal 
Records—The Big Lie, 61 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 378, 378 (1970) (“Record 
sealing and expungement have been accepted casually and extended uncritically over the 
years, prospering in a rosy glow of good intentions and expediency, with little attention to 
evaluation of results.”).   
 99. Concern about access to public information transcends the expungement realm. See, 
e.g., Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597–98 (1978); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 
693, 712 (1976) (holding that there is no due process right that inhibits the government from 
disclosing criminal record information); Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F.3d 620, 626 (8th Cir. 1996); 
Rogers v. Slaughter, 469 F.2d 1084, 1085 (5th Cir. 1972) (noting that “[t]he judicial editing 
of history is likely to produce a greater harm than that sought to be corrected”); see also 
Michael D. Mayfield, Comment, Revisiting Expungement:  Concealing Information in the 
Information Age, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 1057, 1066 (“For some commentators, one of the major 
drawbacks of expungement is that, at its roots, expungement is an institutionalized lie.”).   
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speech.100  Technological advancements regarding big data—in terms of its 
dissemination and its concealment—complicate this debate.101 
But how does expungement, whether pointing toward forgetting or 
forgiving, relate to the purposes of criminal law?  In theory, an arrest results 
from the lawful suspicion of a crime,102 conviction results from an 
assessment by a variety of actors (although mostly the prosecutor) of 
normative and legal blameworthiness,103 and punishment (again in theory) 
results from the assent of the community.104  All three of these events can 
lead to the branding of an individual as criminal or a criminal, thereby 
automatically drawing a line between that individual and the rest of the 
population.105  The principle justification for expungement is that it mitigates 
the public ostracism that results from such branding, thereby restoring the 
“offender[’s] . . . status quo ante.”106  In the context of an arrest, 
expungement cannot counteract the effect of the short-term restraint on 
liberty; however, it can counteract the long-term effects of the arrest on one’s 
 
 100. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 502 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting 
Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)).  But see State ex rel. Cincinnati 
Enquirer v. Winkler, 805 N.E.2d 1094, 1097–98 (Ohio 2004); State v. D.H.W., 686 So. 2d 
1331, 1335–36 (Fla. 1996); see also Marc A. Franklin & Diane Johnsen, Expunging Criminal 
Records:  Concealment and Dishonesty in an Open Society, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 733, 735 
(1981); Kogon & Loughery, supra note 98, at 391 (“Alteration or destruction of the record . . . 
only protects the body politic from confrontation regarding its own aberrant attitudes and the 
necessity to change.  It basically corrupts the fundamental correctional objective of 
rehabilitating offenders.”).  As such, concerns about expungement involve the premise that 
expungement might actually prevent full restoration of the offender because it is an easy way 
out and does not require the community and offender to reconcile.  This seems like a charge 
involving two separate, but related, issues:  (1) rules relating to community access to 
information and (2) community involvement in the administration of discretion postconviction 
(or postarrest).  In other words, if expungement proceedings were not the creature of insiders 
to criminal adjudication but instead reflected community involvement with the capacity to 
express the normative propriety of expungement, that might cure this objection.  I am in the 
process of working through two ideas related to just that:  (1) integrating the community into 
the criminal justice system after prosecution is complete and (2) the concept of what might be 
called “normative brand worthiness,” which addresses the First Amendment concerns of 
communities regarding access to information.   
 101. See Pierre H. Bergeron & Kimberly A. Eberwine, One Step in the Right Direction:  
Ohio’s Framework for Sealing Criminal Records, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 595, 609 (2005) (“[T]he 
individual may have to live the rest of his life with a cloud over his head and hope that his 
secret is never revealed.”).  The fact that there is a dispute over the philosophical merits of 
expungement supports the thesis of this Article.  An examination of prosecutorial decision-
making in this context is even more important if the objectives of the state regarding 
expungement are less than clear.   
 102. Ortman, supra note 58, at 559.  
 103. Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 9, at 1678–80. 
 104. STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1–9 (2012) (contrasting 
community involvement in early American criminal justice with the current divide between 
insiders and outsiders).   
 105. Love, supra note 97, at 1716 (“Permanent changes in a criminal offender’s legal status 
serve[] to emphasize his ‘other-ness.’”).   
 106. Doe v. Utah Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 782 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1989); Mayfield, supra 
note 99, at 1057 (“In an attempt to alleviate the effects of such ostracism, and to help offenders 
reenter society, federal and state governments created expungement laws designed to conceal 
criminal records from the public.”).   
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name.  Additionally, if the charges were without merit, expungement rectifies 
an error in the administration of justice. 
The justification for expungement of conviction information is similar, but 
it recognizes payment of the debt by the offender and that the road to 
rehabilitation is either complete or the path being definitively taken by the 
ex-offender.107  Accordingly, once the formal punishment exacted by the 
community has ended, the cause of the debt can be forgotten.108  The act of 
forgetting enables the former offender to reenter society because readmission 
no longer comes with strings attached.  In a sense, expungement might be 
labeled the completion of the retributive process because it stops the 
informal, and perhaps unintentional, effects of formal punishment.  As such, 
expungement is an extension of the proportionality principle underlying 
retribution because it forecloses continued and unsubstantiated retribution.109  
Expungement operates to reintegrate after punishment, furthering what 
others have referred to as restorative retribution.110 
Theories behind expungement also emphasize its relation to incapacitation 
and rehabilitation.  Expungement may lead to the formal restoration of certain 
rights and privileges, thereby increasing the capabilities of the ex-offender 
upon reentry.111  Additionally, expungement can both result from 
rehabilitation and continue to develop it.112  It can allow the ex-offender to 
 
 107. This is one reason why expungement procedures are often cumbersome for petitioners.  
In another project, “The Process Prevents Expungement,” I will analyze how substantive 
reform of expungement law has not occurred in tandem with procedural reform, thereby 
undermining the promise of recent efforts.   
 108. Linda S. Buethe, Comment, Sealing and Expungement of Criminal Records:  Avoiding 
the Inevitable Social Stigma, 58 NEB. L. REV. 1087, 1089–90 (1979) (“[W]hen a conviction 
does occur and the individual has served time and paid a fine, then is it not true that the 
offender has ‘paid his debt to society?’”).   
 109. HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 436 (1979).  Of course, this assumes 
that continued existence of a criminal record amounts to punishment.  Given the range of 
automatic collateral consequences that result from a record and the proliferation of those 
records, that is a fair assumption. See Chin & Love, supra note 80, at 24; Chin, supra note 56, 
at 1830. 
 110. BIBAS, supra note 104, at 9 (noting how early American criminal justice inflicted 
reintegrative punishment, where “wrongdoers pa[id] their material and moral debts to victims 
and society, wipe[d] their slates clean, and return[ed] to the community as equals”).  In 
documenting early American approaches to reintegration, Bibas describes how convicts in 
Middlesex County, Massachusetts, became politicians, constables, clerks, commissioners, and 
justices of the peace. Id. at 12.   
 111. Mayfield, supra note 99, at 1062 (“The underlying philosophy of expungement has 
always been to rehabilitate prisoners by providing ‘an accessible or effective means of 
restoring social status.’” (quoting Steven K. O’Hern, Note, Expungement:  Lies That Can Hurt 
You in and out of Court, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 574, 576 (1988)).  Mayfield describes how 
expungement arguably has roots in utilitarian punishment theory and particularly 
rehabilitation theory. Id. (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 
24 (2d ed. 1986)).   
 112. See Stephanos Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 329, 
334 (2007) (“Offenders value the good will of their fellow human beings.  In addition, many 
offenders feel the bite of conscience for their misdeeds. . . .  Forgiveness may lighten the 
burden of guilt from their shoulders, making it easier for them to move on with their lives.”); 
Gough, supra note 96, at 162 (noting how expungement gives youth offenders “an incentive 
to reform” by “removing the infamy of [their] social standing”); Love, supra note 97, at 1710 
(“The purpose of judicial expungement or set-aside was to both encourage and reward 
2842 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
experience rehabilitative activities potentially not available when the ex-
offender has a conviction attached to his or her name.  As will be 
demonstrated below, courts routinely look into the condition of the offender 
when assessing whether expungement is appropriate.113  In this regard, others 
have justified expungement because it simultaneously encourages and allows 
for rehabilitation.114 
2.  Expungement Then and Now 
Although nearly every state allows for expungement, the available 
remedies vary greatly by jurisdiction.  They are entirely the creature of state 
law.115  Historically, expungement was only available for arrest information 
where the prosecution did not result in conviction.116  The cause of action—
or basis for an expungement petition—was usually a hodgepodge of statutory 
law and judicially created remedies.117 
In the past, expungement remedies almost always existed when the 
disposition was uniquely favorable to the accused—generally acquittal or 
dropped charges.118  Today, most state jurisdictions allow for the 
expungement or sealing of such nonconviction information.119  Considering 
the breadth of arrest information collected,120 the expungement remedy could 
 
rehabilitation, by restoring social status as well as legal rights.”); Zacharias, supra note 14, at 
181–82; Mayfield, supra note 99, at 1063–64 (“Expungement, then, may be conceptualized as 
a natural step in rehabilitation that allows an offender to become sufficiently reformed through 
reintegration into society.”).  
 113. See infra Part II.B.   
 114. JACOBS, supra note 97, at 114 (“After a certain period of crime-free behavior, the ex-
offender has demonstrated that he has put his past offending behind him and deserves 
reinstatement as a citizen in good standing.”). 
 115. Recently, there has been some proposed legislation at the federal level as part of the 
REDEEM Act. See Press Release, Senator Cory Booker, Paul, Booker, Cummings Introduce 
Bipartisan, Bicameral Bill to Fix Broken Criminal Justice System (Apr. 5, 2017), 
https://www.booker.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=573 [https://perma.cc/PM7L-GBM5].  
 116. See Joseph C. Dugan, I Did My Time:  The Transformation of Indiana’s Expungement 
Law, 90 IND. L.J. 1321, 1335 (2015) (noting that “individuals could petition for expungement 
if they were arrested and released without charge or if the charges filed against them were 
dropped due to mistaken identity, no offense in fact, or absence of probable cause”); see also 
LOVE, supra note 18, at 113–24 (surveying judicial postconviction remedies, including 
expungement).  For example, as of 2006, Wisconsin only allowed expungement of 
misdemeanor convictions if they occurred before the offender was twenty-one. Id. at 124. 
 117. Pennsylvania is an example of this hybrid legal regime.  Pennsylvania has an 
expungement statute that was inspired by mid- to late twentieth century court decisions. See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Wexler, 431 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. 1981).  Minnesota’s regime was 
initially similar. See generally Jon Geffen & Stefanie Letze, Chained to the Past:  An Overview 
of Criminal Expungement Law in Minnesota—State v. Schultz, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1331, 1344 n.96 (2005) (describing the history of expungement law in Minnesota).  In 1977, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that expungement was an equitable remedy 
under the state constitution. In re R.L.F., 256 N.W.2d 803, 807–08 (Minn. 1977).  Four years 
later, it legitimized trial court expungement. State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn. 1981). 
 118. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. D.M., 695 A.2d 770, 773 (Pa. 1997) (granting automatic 
expungement of charges resulting in acquittal).   
 119. LOVE, supra note 18, at 43–61, app. A (cataloguing all jurisdictions that allow for 
expungement of nonconviction information).   
 120. See, e.g., supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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become available to many people, thereby amplifying the significance of the 
parties who play a role in its granting or denial.  Standards of review vary for 
dispositions in between acquittal and conviction, such as nolle prosequi, 
dismissal, or withdrawn charges.121  In most instances, however, when a 
hearing is granted, courts are tasked with balancing state and private interests 
as related to the criminal record history information.122  Petitioners must 
demonstrate that they are worthy of expungement against a presumption of 
retention of information,123 and only after first overcoming substantial 
procedural hurdles.124 
Over the last decade, expungement reform has occurred in various 
jurisdictions, which has widened the availability of relief.  In the last ten 
years, over 80 percent of states have tried to create additional expungement 
remedies.125  These measures include expanding the types of information, 
including convictions, that are eligible for expungement;126 shortening 
waiting periods;127 clarifying the legal effect of an expungement with respect 
to both an ex-offender’s history and future activities of an ex-offender;128 
adding private rights of action against those who mishandle expunged 
information;129 and lowering the burdens of proof and persuasion when 
 
 121. See LOVE, supra note 18, at 43–61, app. A (noting such regimes in Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Delaware, Washington, D.C., Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and 
Virginia).  In fact, Pennsylvania continues to have a regime that distinguishes between types 
of nonconviction dispositions, especially in the case of a guilty plea to a lesser charge.  For 
example, the law treats nolle prossed charges from the same case as a guilty plea differently 
than dismissed charges. Compare Commonwealth v. Lutz, 788 A.2d 993, 995 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2001) (holding that dismissed charges that result from a plea deal are components of a quasi 
contract and are not entitled to expungement), with Commonwealth v. Hanna, 964 A.2d 923, 
925–29 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (holding that nolle prossed charges that accompany a plea deal 
to another charge may still be expunged). 
 122. See, e.g., Meinken v. Burgess, 426 S.E.2d 876, 879 (Ga. 1993); Commonwealth v. 
Wexler, 431 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. 1981).   
 123. See Geffen & Lentze, supra note 117, at 1344.   
 124. Id. (noting that statutory procedures in Minnesota were “intentionally created to be 
somewhat cumbersome to help protect the presumption that criminal records remain publicly 
available”).   
 125. See generally RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. FOR JUSTICE, RELIEF IN SIGHT?:  





 126. Since 2011, the following states have made some changes to their expungement law 
to allow for expungement of conviction information:  California, Colorado, Idaho (juvenile 
offenders), Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts (lowered waiting periods), 
Minnesota, North Dakota (changed grading), Ohio, Tennessee, Utah (lowered waiting 
periods), Vermont, and Wyoming. See generally Restoration of Rights Project, NAT’L ASS’N 
CRIM. DEF. LAW., http://restoration.ccresourcecenter.org [https://perma.cc/K85S-PGLD] (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 127. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 125, at 14 (“Many states have recognized that overly 
long waiting periods place a burden on those simply trying to move on with their lives.”). 
 128. Id. at 15–16.   
 129. Id.  
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petitioning for expungement.130  The effect of these reforms cannot be 
overstated, and citizens and attorneys have begun to respond by prioritizing 
expungement in their pro bono work.131  Free clinics offering to assist with 
expungement petitions are now common, with hundreds of ex-offenders 
desiring assistance.132 
Expungement reform has typically been divided into two forms of relief:  
(1) “forgetting” measures that aim to “expunge” data in the traditional sense 
of the word, meaning erasing or sealing it; and (2) “forgiving” measures, 
which aim to alleviate the effects of a criminal record through measures like 
certificates of rehabilitation.133  Of course, statutes that lead to forgetting by 
definition imply some level of forgiving, and laws that allow for forgiveness 
presume some future forgetting. 
There are certain trends in recent reforms.  First, states are moving toward 
expanding the types of information eligible for expungement or sealing.134  
The range of criminal record history information that is considered eligible 
in various jurisdictions reflects the recognition that low-level misdemeanors 
and order-maintenance offenses are overwhelming the system with 
catastrophic long-term consequences on individual development and 
communities.135  Information now eligible for expungement includes 
nonviolent misdemeanor offenses, particularly drug crimes, and other low-
level convictions.136  These expansions typically involve waiting periods 
linked to the perceived severity of the offense, which can range from three to 
ten years.137 
 
 130. Id. at 17, 21 (noting how some states have decided to remove judicial discretion from 
the process and instead automatically provide for expungement if the petitioner meets certain 
criteria).   
 131. See, e.g., Lynh Bui, Fair Offers Free Legal Help for Those Seeking to Clear Their 
Records of Criminal Charges, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/expungement-fair-offers-free-legal-
help-for-those-seeking-to-clear-their-records/2017/01/12/0f4bd84a-d8df-11e6-9a36-
1d296534b31e_story.html? [https://perma.cc/S4JU-DPCE]; Julie Shaw, Philadelphia Bar 
Association to Hold Free Criminal Record Expungement Clinic, PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept. 27, 
2016), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/real-time/Phila-Bar-Association-to-hold-free-
expungement-clinic.html [https://perma.cc/HG8K-PAPC].  
 132. NLG Expungement Project a Success, TEMPLE U. BEASLEY SCH. L. (Nov. 4, 2014), 
https://www.law.temple.edu/news/nlg-expungement-project-success/ [https://perma.cc/ 
A2SN-S7YM].   
 133. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4852.01 (West 2018). 
 134. See Andrea Papagianis, More States Attempting to Seal Criminal Records, REPORTERS 
COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-
media-law/news-media-and-law-spring-2012/more-states-attempting-seal [https://perma.cc/ 
KK7L-5XV4] (article from the spring 2012 edition of News Media and the Law). 
 135. Bui, supra note 131 (quoting an attorney affiliated with an expungement clinic who 
said, “I wonder how many people are laboring along, who are hopeless and discouraged and 
may have minor nuisance offenses that they can expunge and they just don’t know”). 
 136. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-9-2(a)–(b) (West 2018); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art. 971 (2018) (“The inability to obtain an expungement can prevent certain individuals 
from obtaining gainful employment.”); Maryland Second Chance Act of 2015, MD. CODE 
ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-301(f) (West 2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.02 (West 2018). 
 137. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-9-2(c); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 977–78 (2018); MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-303; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.02(3)(a)(3). 
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Reforms have also attempted to restrict the usage of expunged information.  
In Indiana, the law determines availability of expunged records according to 
the seriousness of the offense.138  Some more recent state laws prohibit state 
entities from automatically disclosing information to the general public139 or 
using it during future law enforcement actions.140  These laws also task 
governmental entities with sending updated information, or an order of 
expungement, to the private databases that hold the information, although 
whether private entities that continue to disclose expunged information are 
subject to penalties varies by jurisdiction.141 
Interestingly, jurisdictions diverge regarding whether expungement should 
be automatic in certain situations.  Some reforms have allowed for automatic 
expungement upon a showing by the petitioner that any procedural hurdles 
have been met.142  Others, like Minnesota, continue to defer decision-making 
to a judge and call for the balancing of public interests and private 
interests.143  In either situation, the prosecutor plays a crucial role.  In the 
case of potential automatic expungement, prosecutors are often the 
gatekeepers for pointing out procedural error in petitions.144  The significance 
of this function is remarkable considering that some state reforms, like that 
of Maryland, only allow petitioners one bite at the apple.145  If the state allows 
for a hearing, prosecutors might object to expungement on either procedural 
or substantive grounds.  In the latter situation, petitioners may have to 
overcome something tantamount to a clear-and-convincing-evidence 
standard to bypass the prosecutorial objection.146 
Thus, even when the law might provide for automatic expungement, or at 
least express a presumption in favor of expungement, the formal and informal 
procedural hurdles embedded in the administration of the law provide 
mechanisms through which a prosecutor can stall or hasten expungement.  
And the prosecutor’s decision-making implicates public policy, theories of 
punishment, state interests, and the situation of the offender.  The rest of this 
 
 138. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-38-9-2 to -4 (noting standards for misdemeanors and felonies); 
see also Dugan, supra note 116, at 1341–42 nn.129–37. 
 139. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-38-9-2 to -4.  But see MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-
302(b)(2) (allowing dissemination of the information by the state entity upon request from an 
employer).   
 140. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-305. 
 141. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 974(A) (“A private third-party entity, 
excluding a news-gathering organization, that compiles and disseminates criminal history 
information for compensation shall not disseminate any information in its possession 
regarding an arrest, conviction, or other disposition after it has received notice of an issuance 
of a court order to expunge the record of any such arrest or conviction.”). 
 142. Murray, supra note 5, at 371 (“Like Maryland’s statute, the Louisiana statute limits 
judicial discretion:  expungement is automatic if the eligibility requirements are met.”).  Some 
judges have balked at the loss of discretion. See, e.g., Cline v. State, 61 N.E.3d 360, 363 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2016) (noting that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied an expungement 
petition that met all statutory requirements).   
 143. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.03(5)(a)(1)–(12) (West 2018). 
 144. See infra Part II.A.   
 145. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-303(e)(4). 
 146. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.03(5)(c)(1)–(12). 
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Article examines the nature of that involvement in the context of the overall 
prosecutorial role. 
II.  PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND EXPUNGEMENT 
This Part examines the role of the prosecutor in various state regimes and 
moves on to explore three alternative approaches to expungement that 
prosecutors might adopt in the expungement realm. It concludes with a 
discussion of existing scholarship in this area, arguing that academics have 
yet to comprehensively address how prosecutors should pursue justice in the 
expungement context. 
A.  The Power of the Prosecutor Under 
Current Expungement Regimes 
State legislatures allow prosecutors to wield remarkable influence over the 
procedural and substantive aspects of expungement law.147  The authority 
afforded prosecutors ranges from an extension of the quasi-judicial 
expectations already existing at other phases, to the role of pure adversary 
with the power to manipulate process in addition to making substantive 
arguments.148  Prosecutors act as the first line of review—they make 
determinations as to whether petitions should be heard by a judge, possess 
veto authority over petitions, can bargain about expungement rights, and can 
assent to quicker relief than otherwise provided by state law.149  How a 
prosecutor chooses to engage with each of these responsibilities can be the 
difference between a smooth expungement process—and the road to full 
reentry—or a bureaucratic, Kafkaesque150 nightmare. 
In multiple jurisdictions, prosecutors are the first reviewers after a petition 
for expungement is filed, and they can be procedural force fields capable of 
blocking relief.  In California, a prosecutor’s rejection of an expungement 
petition results in its automatic denial; although that denial is appealable, the 
cost of the prosecutor’s inaction to the lay petitioner—who has already 
navigated significant procedural thickets to file the petition in the first 
place—is immeasurable.151 
California’s law provides one end of a spectrum.  More jurisdictions 
resemble that of Georgia, where the prosecutor has ninety days to determine 
 
 147. See infra notes 151–66.  
 148. Id.  
 149. Id.  
 150. FRANZ KAFKA, Before the Law, in FRANZ KAFKA:  THE COMPLETE STORIES 3, 3 
(Nahum N. Glatzer ed., Willa & Edwin Muir trans., 1971) (“Before the law stands a 
doorkeeper.  To this doorkeeper there comes a man from the country and prays for admittance 
to the Law.  But the doorkeeper says that he cannot grant admittance at the moment.  The man 
thinks it over and then asks if he will be allowed in later.  ‘It is possible,’ says the doorkeeper, 
‘but not at the moment.’”).   
 151. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(b) (West 2018).  A significant number of ex-offenders 
are indigent, which means that petitioners are also likely to be battling other hurdles—such as 
filing fees and costs—at the time of their petition, making the effect of a denial even more 
significant. See Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration and Social Inequality, 
DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 8, 8. 
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whether the petition meets the statutory criteria for expungement; if it does 
not, the prosecutor can return the petition to the petitioner with a notice 
indicating that the petition failed for procedural reasons.152  The lay petitioner 
receiving that response from an agent of the state—who took her liberty at an 
earlier date—might naturally feel deterred from pushing harder.  
Nevertheless, the burden then shifts to the lay petitioner to demonstrate—by 
clear and convincing evidence—that the arrest is eligible for 
expungement.153  In other places, prosecutorial consent is necessary simply 
to file a petition.154 
Prosecutors also have the authority to judge the merits of petitions before 
they reach a judge.  For example, Colorado lets prosecutors act as referees, 
or administrative law judges, prior to judicial involvement.155  If the 
prosecutor does not object, expungement is automatic; after an objection, a 
petitioner must proceed to an in-person hearing, and it is only then that the 
judiciary becomes involved.156 
A few states also permit prosecutors to initiate expungements.  Delaware 
mandates expungement when the prosecutor files the petition.157  When the 
prosecutor does not begin the process, the petitioner must show “manifest 
injustice” due to the record.158  Interestingly, Hawaii raises the stakes by 
vesting absolute expungement authority in the office of the prosecutor:  the 
judiciary’s reach only extends to court information.159  Prosecutors can 
ignore judicial decisions granting expungements for functionally similar 
information, forcing petitioners to have to seek erasure of information in 
multiple venues.  New York has a similar rule for information relating to 
arrests that did not result in charges.160  Notice that the above provisions seem 
to presume ineligibility for expungement. 
While some jurisdictions afford prosecutors the above, first-line-of-
defense responsibilities, the majority of states give prosecutors the ability to 
affect the process by which an expungement is pursued and to advocate on 
behalf of the state with respect to the petition.  In various places, courts can 
only expunge without a hearing if there is no initial objection by the 
 
 152. GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-37(n)(2) (West 2018). 
 153. Id. § 35-3-37(n)(3).  But see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-704(1)(b)(I) (West 2018) 
(allowing judges to determine whether grounds for a hearing exist).   
 154. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0585(2)(a) (West 2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-24 
(West 2018). 
 155. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-704(1)(b)(I). 
 156. Id.  
 157. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4374(c) (West 2018).   
 158. Id. 
 159. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 831-3.2 (West 2018).   
 160. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.50(1), (4) (McKinney 2018).   
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prosecutor.161  This rule applies to both criminal record information 
involving convictions and to nonconviction arrest information.162 
Similarly, some jurisdictions mandate expungement when prosecutors do 
not object.  In California, the “concurrence of the prosecuting attorney” 
requires the arresting agency to seal arrest records.163  Colorado mandates 
expungement of various grades of misdemeanor convictions when the 
prosecutor does not object.164  This is a remarkable amount of power:  if a 
petitioner can convince the prosecutor, or the prosecutor simply fails to 
respond, the law requires expungement of a conviction, bypassing any role 
for the judiciary that presumably played a role in the original conviction.  
That is the rule in several other states as well, whether involving conviction 
or nonconviction information.165  By locating significant authority in the 
prosecutor’s initial review of the petition without providing any guidance as 
to the metric for that review, these statutes essentially eliminate stakeholders 
from the process.166 
Prosecutorial decision-making relating to expungement petitions has the 
capacity to lengthen the process and make it more difficult to obtain relief.  
Objections to expungement, warranted or not, often require that the matter be 
listed for a hearing, thereby demanding the presence of both parties and an 
evidentiary showing.167  In most jurisdictions, courts are required to hold 
 
 161. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-907.01(B) (2018) (“If the prosecutor does not oppose the 
application, the court may grant the application and vacate the conviction without a hearing.”); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1413(b)(2)(B)(i) (West 2018) (“If notice of opposition is not filed, 
the court may grant the uniform petition.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(d) (West 2018) (“In 
any case where a person has been arrested and an accusatory pleading has been filed, but where 
no conviction has occurred, the court may, with the concurrence of the prosecuting attorney, 
grant the relief provided in subdivision (b) at the time of the dismissal of the accusatory 
pleading.”); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2630/5.2(d)(6)(B) (West 2018); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-9-
9(a) (West 2018); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-303(d)(2) (West 2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:52-11 (West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-40-103(8) to -107(7) (West 2017); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 19.2-392.2(F) (West 2018).   
 162. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-907.01(B); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-
1413(b)(2)(B)(i); CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(d).  
 163. CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(a).  
 164. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-705(1)(d)(II), (e)(II) (West 2018).   
 165. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-37(n)(2) (West 2018) (noting that for pre-2013 
arrests, “if record restriction is approved by the prosecuting attorney, the arresting law 
enforcement agency shall restrict the criminal history record information”); 20 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 2630/5.2(d)(6)(B) (providing for automatic expungement if no objection); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 901C.1 (West. 2016) (providing for automatic expungement upon no objection or 
initiation by a prosecutor, which is allowed under the statute); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 431.076(3) (West 2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.025(a) (West 2018) (providing for 
automatic expungement unless the court finds it contrary to the public interest); N.Y. CRIM. 
PROC. LAW § 160.50(1) (McKinney 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7602(a)(3) (West 2018); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-13-1401(c), 7-13-1501(f), 7-13-1502(f) (West 2018).  
 166. This arguably amounts to a separation of powers issue that might be worth exploring.   
 167. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-907.01(C) (“If the prosecutor opposes the application, 
the court shall hold a hearing on the application.”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1413(b)(2)(B)(II) 
(“If notice of opposition is filed, the court shall set the matter for a hearing if the record for 
which the uniform petition was filed is eligible for sealing under this subchapter unless the 
prosecuting attorney consents to allow the court to decide the case solely on the pleadings.”); 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-705(1)(d)(II)–(III) (misdemeanor and felony convictions); id. 
§ 24-72-705(1)(e)(III) (felony drug possession convictions); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
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hearings after prosecutors object to a petition.168  The unintentional costs 
should not be discounted in such a situation, especially considering the 
presumed deleterious effects of a criminal record. 
Prosecutors also wield authority to activate hidden provisions in state 
statutes, which broaden or narrow the relief possibilities for petitioners.  
Many jurisdictions require petitioners to wait a certain amount of time from 
the date of disposition before filing a petition.169  In some jurisdictions, these 
waiting periods exist even for nonconviction information.170  But in a state 
like Indiana or Minnesota, prosecutors can eliminate or elongate the waiting 
period by consenting to expungement or requesting more time for review.171  
In Minnesota, expungement following dismissal of charges can be 
instantaneous if the prosecutor consents.172  In North Carolina, a prosecutor 
can delay expungement by asking for additional time to review a petition.173 
Prosecutors also possess other expungement-related responsibilities.  Most 
jurisdictions require prosecutors to comply with court orders mandating 
expungement, which means that offices must have internal processes for 
eliminating information.174  Only some states maintain private rights of 
action for failing to comply with such orders, so improper dissemination or 
use by the agency remains largely unchecked.175  Some jurisdictions assign 
notice responsibilities to prosecutors, thus requiring prosecutors to contact 
other agencies after an order mandates expungement or sealing.176  Such 
provisions require disciplined internal procedures by prosecutors who might 
not be inclined to act, thus possibly rendering ineffective expungements 
ordered by a court. 
In addition to their procedural powers during expungement processes, 
prosecutors are not limited in the factors they can consider when advocating 
for or against a petition.  Most jurisdictions identify factors that courts should 
consider when determining the merits of an expungement petition177 but very 
few provide guidance to prosecutors as to how they should approach the 
substantive merits of a petition.178  Most often, prosecutors can pick and 
choose their justifications for opposing expungement without tethering them 
to concepts of the prosecutorial role after disposition.  To name a few, 
 
2630/5.2(d)(7); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-9-9(c) (West 2018); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
980(D) (2018); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-303(e)(1) (West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 77-40-103(6), 77-40-107(6)(a) (West 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-13-1401(c), 7-13-
1501(e), 7-13-1502(e). 
 168. See supra note 167. 
 169. See Murray, supra note 5, at 369–73. 
 170. Id.   
 171. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-38-9-1(b), -9-2(c), -9-2(e)(4), -9-3(e)(4), -9-4(c), -9-
4(e)(4); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.025(c) (West 2018). 
 172. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.025(c).   
 173. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-145.5(c) (West 2018).   
 174. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122(c) (2018) (detailing prosecutorial responsibilities 
postexpungement, which includes retaining certain information).   
 175. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9183(a) (2018). 
 176. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-6(a)(4) (West 2018). 
 177. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wexler, 431 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. 1981). 
 178. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-37(n)(2) (West 2018). 
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prosecutors might be mindful of the progress of the offender’s rehabilitation; 
the effect that an expungement might have on that process; the already 
existing and potential harm attendant to maintenance of an arrest record; the 
need for the information in the future, either for usage by law enforcement or 
others; and the value of truth to the criminal justice system and public as a 
whole, as well as the individual parties involved in a case.  While all of these 
considerations are legitimate, the state laws demonstrate that in most states, 
prosecutors are left with little to no guidance for thinking through them.  This 
legislative silence is particularly troubling as it relates to the initial review 
phases, where the prosecutor has significant power to affect later 
proceedings. 
Current regimes also afford prosecutors wide discretion in how they may 
choose to use information otherwise ordered sealed or expunged.  The default 
rule in most jurisdictions is that expungement renders information mostly 
private, with only a select few individuals or institutions maintaining the 
authority to view the information.179  It is usually the case that prosecutors 
are included in that small group, but the parameters of how prosecutors might 
use that information, and whether they face penalties for doing so, are 
typically a matter of internal policy.180  Without guidance as to how to act 
before, during, and after an expungement, or how to prioritize the 
considerations mentioned above—legally or ethically—it follows logically 
that prosecutorial discretion at this phase can become entirely arbitrary.  
Decisions could turn on a variety of factors or a combination thereof, 
including who an offender knows, internal office dynamics, the 
organizational structure of an office, and prosecutorial workload.  This can 
result in divergent and inconsistent results, not to mention costly effects for 
various stakeholders in expungement processes. 
B.  Prosecutorial Incentives and Expungement Regimes 
The significant leeway given to prosecutors in expungement regimes can 
lead to serious, rippling effects, especially if the prosecutor knows the 
consequences of a criminal record.  These approaches can reflect the 
structural, personal, and psychological incentives within prosecutors’ offices, 
such as the prioritization of law enforcement objectives, administrative 
efficiency, conviction integrity, notions of self-worth, public policy, and 
theories of punishment and proportionality. 
When it comes to exercising discretion after a prosecution, there are 
institutional, professional, and psychological reasons why a prosecutor will 
default to protecting a conviction or preserving a record of an arrest even if 
the charges did not result in a conviction.181  Put most simply, prosecutors 
are judged at a macro and micro level according to their ability to appear 
 
 179. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122(c). 
 180. Id. 
 181. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice:  Preaching to the 
Unconverted from the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 38 (2009) 
(“[I]nstitutional, professional, and psychological incentives are normally aligned with 
preserving the integrity of the trial result.”).   
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“tough on crime.”182  The efficient achievement of convictions is the fastest 
way to project that message.183  On an individual level, a prosecutor’s win-
loss record might become the measure of his self-worth.184  In the 
expungement context, this means that a default position against 
expungement—especially for a legitimate conviction—is naturally attractive. 
As such, conviction rates—and preserving convictions—contribute to 
what others have labeled a “conviction psychology,”185 which the front lines 
of investigation, bargaining, and trial cultivate and reinforce.  Winning 
indicates effectiveness and advances careers.  This is why some offices 
prioritize the achievement of convictions and their longevity over other 
goals.186  When the metric is the efficient disposition of cases with a bias 
toward convictions, or at least conviction-like dispositions, prosecutors 
default to being advocates against expungement.187  In reality, the 
conviction-first mindset probably comes down to the nature of prosecutors’ 
offices and of the adversarial system, which reinforces prioritization of 
prosecutorial advocacy at all costs.  Prosecutors’ offices are beholden to their 
constituents, including voters and partners in law enforcement.188  Thus, 
political pressures and institutional relationships foster prioritizing the 
achievement and preservation of convictions. 
If convictions are uprooted after the fact, the office risks looking soft and 
possibly disloyal to its institutional partners who are also invested in 
achieving convictions.189  After all, the majority of prosecutors spend most 
of their days interacting with other parties whose aim is to achieve 
convictions.190  The result when it comes to expungement is this:  although 
 
 182. Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, It Is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It Is How You Play 
the Game:  Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors?, 38 CAL. 
W. L. REV. 283, 295 (2001) (“A prosecutor must give the people what they want—someone 
who is ‘tough on crime.’” (quoting Patricia Manson, For Defense, Reform Tide Is a Buoyant 
Force, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 22, 2000, at 1)). 
 183. Medwed, supra note 181, at 45 (“[C]hief prosecutors tend to cite their offices’ overall 
conviction records to justify their budgets to local politicians and to demonstrate, above all, 
that they are ‘tough’ on crime.”).   
 184. Id.; Ferguson-Gilbert, supra note 182, at 292 (“Many prosecutors measure their 
success by the number of wins they tally.”).   
 185. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 33, at 472 n.32. 
 186. Medwed, supra note 181, at 44 (“Some prosecutorial offices unabashedly use 
conviction rates as a motivational device—for example, by internally distributing attorneys’ 
‘batting averages,’ or listing each lawyer by name on a bulletin board with a series of stickers 
reflecting the conclusions of their recent cases (green for convictions and red for acquittals).”).   
 187. Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor:  A Conceptual Framework, 
15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 207 (1987) (citing George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor:  A Look at 
Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 118–19 (1975)).   
 188. Id. at 204–15 (listing the ways that and reasons why a prosecutor might be 
overzealous).   
 189. Ferguson-Gilbert, supra note 182, at 294 (“Prosecutors who do not want to get caught 
up in the scorekeeping, conviction-seeking mentality often do anyway because being the 
whistle blower is against the prosecutor’s own self-interest in promotions or career 
advancement.”).   
 190. Fisher, supra note 187, at 209 (“[T]he prosecutor, having no individual client, 
naturally tends to treat victims and police officers as clients or, at least, as spokespersons for 
the ‘public interest.’” (quoting Donald M. McIntyre, Impediments to Effective Police-
Prosecutor Relationships, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 201, 219 (1975))). 
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the state has offered an avenue for relief, prosecutorial incentives—at least 
on the surface—arguably lead to a strong presumption against acquiescing to 
the defendant’s petition for relief.  Expungement does not naturally fit with 
this adversarial mentality.  Consenting to expungement amounts to agreeing 
to undo hours of work by the prosecutor—hours by which the prosecutor 
measures his own worth.  To the average prosecutor, unstitching a carefully 
achieved conviction—the proverbial “scarlet letter”—requires significant 
justification. 
Still, prosecutors who sense the policy objectives underlying the statute, 
and how they might align with doing justice, might act less reflexively.  
Prosecutors might seek to preserve or mitigate the effects of criminal records 
or even remain indifferent due to a belief that they are beyond the concern of 
the prosecutor.  This Part presents different approaches to expungement that 
might be adopted by prosecutors in light of their motivations and incentives, 
and it identifies their strengths and weaknesses in order to juxtapose them 
with understandings of the prosecutor as a minister of justice. 
1.  Criminal Records Preservation 
As noted above, statutory regimes provide prosecutors ample ways to 
entrench the existence of criminal records, either in the short or long term 
and irrespective of the scope of the substantive remedies afforded by 
statute.191  The natural instincts of prosecutors—cultivated by a culture that 
values convictions—justify viewing expungement skeptically, even if a 
statute suggests a policy in favor of the remedy.  For example, although 
Indiana’s progressive expungement regime enables prosecutorial consent to 
override otherwise applicable waiting periods, there is no guarantee that 
prosecutors will do so as a matter of public (or internal-office) policy.192  
Rather, incentives and professional expectations might drive prosecutors to 
preserve the work of the office by ensuring the continued existence of a 
legitimate (in the eyes of the prosecutor) conviction, arrest, or set of 
charges.193  Prioritizing the preservation of criminal records likely stems 
from the belief that the creation of such records is a desirable end.  This 
position is probably most in line—and in many instances, validly so—with 
the default position of the average prosecutor, who has invested significant 
institutional and personal time and effort pursuing a legitimate conviction.194  
In the case of pursuing charges after an arrest, the prosecutor recognizes and 
validates the efforts of law enforcement. 
Prosecutors seeking to preserve records can exercise their discretion 
during the expungement phase in two ways.  First, they can utilize all 
procedural hurdles that are either explicitly or implicitly allowed by the 
 
 191. See supra Part II.A. 
 192. See supra note 138.  
 193. See NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 8-1.2 (NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N 2009) 
(“[T]he prosecutor should defend a legally-obtained conviction and a properly-assessed 
punishment.”). 
 194. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 174 (“[P]rosecutors’ incentives at the postconviction stage 
militate against taking action that benefits convicted defendants.”).   
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statute.  Prosecutors can delay the process of expungement by requesting 
additional time to review a petition, nitpicking procedural or minor errors in 
pro se petitions, and refusing to consent to otherwise meritorious petitions.  
By doing so, they maintain a presumption against expungement, and statutes 
that allow for this type of behavior solidify that presumption. 
Second, prosecutors might make a point of opposing expungement at 
almost every turn out of concern for future law enforcement efforts, broader 
values relating to pursuing the truth at all costs, or due to belief that the 
offender should suffer the consequences associated with the criminal record.  
This approach arguably has support in existing ethical codes, which identify 
the primary responsibility of prosecutors as “seek[ing] justice . . . [through 
the] presentation of truth.”195  The prosecutor views the continued existence 
of criminal records as crucial to safeguarding the public and prioritizing the 
“interests of society in a paramount position.”196  The mentality is similar to 
a prosecutor who seeks to enforce rather than mitigate collateral 
consequences.197  Preserving criminal records is the logical outgrowth of the 
metric of winning and the conviction mentality mentioned above.198 
This approach has the benefit of guaranteeing a robust defense of the 
advocate role of the prosecutor within the criminal justice system.  It holds 
that criminal convictions, arrests, and any contact by a defendant with the 
criminal justice system warrants serious attention that should not be erased 
regardless of the unintended, attendant consequences.  Entrenching criminal 
records sends a message to the public that contacts with the system are real 
and serious and that they will not be forgotten short of significant legislative 
or executive action above the level of the prosecutor, such as through use of 
the pardon power.  In this sense, preserving criminal records comports with 
the prosecutor’s law enforcement duties.  The prosecutor justifies retention 
of the scarlet letter in the name of deterrence or limiting recidivism.199  
Further, retention allows the prosecutor to enforce collateral consequences 
that the prosecutor might think are useful and justified.200  This also connects 
 
 195. NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-1.1. 
 196. Id. § 1-1.2.   
 197. Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1198, 1222 (2016) 
(“In taking the collateral enforcement approach, prosecutors might seek out information about 
the defendant’s public benefits or immigration status, and they might leverage the plea 
bargaining process to induce defendants to waive protections . . . .”).   
 198. See supra Part II.A.  
 199. Interestingly, this justification was behind initial efforts to catalogue criminal record 
history information. See Corda, supra note 10, at 9 (discussing how the origin of maintaining 
criminal record history information involved concerns about punishing recidivists harshly in 
the name of deterrence).   
 200. Jain, supra note 197, at 1225 (“Prosecutors might view collateral consequences as a 
more administratively efficient substitute for serious criminal sanctions. . . .  Civil penalties 
that attach to low-level offenses, on the other hand, impose no additional administrative 
burdens.  This approach can also save costs for corrections as a whole.  Prosecutors who take 
this approach may find that it allows them to take more cases overall and also avoids costs 
associated with incarceration.”).   
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to a prosecutor’s sense of ensuring proportional punishment, especially if the 
prosecutor believes that the direct sanction was too lenient.201 
Ensuring the continued existence of criminal records means that the 
prosecutor is guarantor of the public record and has a recordkeeping 
responsibility that contributes to the legal system’s overall integrity, both in 
terms of criminal justice and broader public values, such as those relating to 
the free dissemination of information.  The latter principles are often the basis 
of arguments in litigation involving the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the 
accurate reporting of criminal records, including those that have been 
expunged.202  Additionally, the prosecutor pursuing preservation is probably 
mindful of her relationship with other well-intentioned third parties or 
agencies, which might have an interest in knowing about an offender’s past.  
As such, the prosecutor views himself as partnering with other entities to 
protect the public.  This approach responds directly to the institutional 
commitments described above, where the prosecutor’s prioritization of 
relationships with partners in law enforcement drives behavior toward 
defendants. 
Of course, responding to expungement this way is not without its costs.  
Part I already detailed the range of consequences for individuals with 
criminal records.  Some of these are legitimate and some are not, but they 
exist, and they create a real barrier to full reentry.  The immediate 
consequences of a denied petition can be catastrophic for the petitioner:  some 
jurisdictions limit refiling until after a lengthy waiting period, which can 
range from one to five years.203  Perhaps more importantly, a denied petition 
likely means continued incapacitation due to a criminal record and might 
violate principles of proportionality in punishment.204  Restoration then is 
delayed because the retribution inherent to the criminal record never ceases, 
which inhibits new contributions by the ex-offender.  This is justified in some 
situations, but in others it is not.  Yet the prosecutorial incentives driving a 
hostile position toward expungement can allow such concerns to go 
unnoticed. 
A second set of costs relates to procedural justice and alienation from the 
law.  Criminal record history information operates to incapacitate 
individuals—both in terms of what those individuals can do and accomplish 
in the future and in terms of their attitudes toward the system as a whole.205  
Entrenching a reputation after payment of a debt arguably extends 
 
 201. Id. (“[T]he prosecutor may appropriate the collateral consequence for retributive 
reasons.”).   
 202. See Sharon Dietrich, May Background Screeners Lawfully Report Expunged 
Records?, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CTR. (Mar. 18, 2018, 9:08 AM), 
http://ccresourcecenter.org/2018/02/06/may-background-screeners-lawfully-report-
expunged-records/ [https://perma.cc/VX5S-HZFY] (discussing judicial treatment of 
background-check screeners who report expunged criminal records as a potential violation of 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act).   
 203. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-413(a)(2) (West 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 7605 (West 2018). 
 204. Corda, supra note 10, at 42–44 (discussing how the stigma associated with criminal 
record information relates to retributive principles of proportionality).  
 205. See supra Part I.A.  
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punishment beyond the crime and without the assent of the community.  This 
fosters a sense of illegitimacy in the law; the idea being that the law never 
lets go regardless of what the offender does to repair harm that resulted from 
her crime.  If the community desires a more liberal attitude toward 
expungement, this approach suffers from agency-cost problems due to a 
chasm between communal and legislative perspectives and the prosecutorial 
pursuit of those objectives, especially as the prosecutor is acting on behalf of 
“the people.”  As will be explored in further detail below, a prosecutor at this 
end of the spectrum arguably fails to appreciate the quasi-judicial nature of 
her discretion at this phase.206 
This is precisely where progressive expungement regimes might run into 
the cold, hard reality that some prosecutors will defend records at all costs, 
even when the illegitimacy of the underlying conviction or arrest is not at 
issue.  This is arguably a third problem created by the preservation 
approach—undermining the separation of powers.  Expungement regimes, in 
theory, involve all branches of government:  the legislature sets policy and 
the scope of remedies, the judiciary determines the merits of a petition, and 
the prosecutor represents the executive branch and the public and enforces 
the decision of the judge.  When prosecutors operate to entrench records, 
especially in situations where expungement would be otherwise automatic or 
preferred by statute, they undermine the other branches of government by 
disregarding legislative will and subverting the judiciary. 
2.  Criminal Records Mitigation 
Whereas prosecutors seeking to maintain records in almost all situations 
approach expungement with a presumption against relief, those who seek to 
mitigate the collateral consequences of criminal records tend to emphasize 
forgiveness and prioritize mercy over justice in the end phases of criminal 
litigation.  This approach tends to focus on the situation of the individual 
offender rather than the prosecutor’s perception of the interests of society.  
These prosecutors tend to consider the effects of criminal records to be 
disproportionate to the original reason for the creation of the criminal record.  
And the justification for a more open approach stems from a different metric 
of success—reducing recidivism.207 
Mitigation has the advantage of being in line with modern-day 
expungement reforms because it seeks to broaden relief for a range of 
individuals.  The mitigation approach sees the deleterious effects of a mere 
arrest and therefore proposes a presumption in favor of expungement.  
Statutes like those in Delaware, Hawaii, and Tennessee, which allow for 
prosecutor-initiated expungement, reflect this understanding.208  Statutes that 
limit the arbitrary construction of procedural hurdles for petitioners reflect 
this as well, as do laws and that require prosecutors to provide legitimate 
 
 206. See infra Part III.A.  
 207. See Denver et al., supra note 4, at 174.  This study demonstrates that the erasure of 
criminal records can reduce recidivism.  Id. 
 208. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4374(e) (West 2018).   
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justifications that go beyond law enforcement priorities when seeking to 
retain records.209  Those same statutes often restrict the usage of sealed or 
expunged information by state actors in the future.210  In short, the statutes 
seek to incentivize and motivate prosecutors to act in ways that go beyond 
the mere pursuit of convictions.  This approach undeniably focuses on the 
effect that the criminal record has on the defendant after completion of the 
direct punishment.  Ongoing harm to the individual is presumed, and 
expungement can account for that reality, even at the expense of the original 
investment by law enforcement in the arrest or conviction. 
Prosecutors who seek to mitigate the effect of criminal records prioritize 
the fact that a debt has been paid by the offender (in the case of a conviction) 
or that an error has been made (in the case of nonconviction charges, for 
whatever reason) over the principle that a contact with the system occurring 
at a historical moment in time should be preserved.  These prosecutors reject 
the idea that the primary responsibilities of a prosecutor are to act as a 
guarantor of truth and advocate on behalf of the state’s penal interests at all 
phases of a prosecution.  While truth might be crucial at the guilt and 
innocence phase, once the conviction has been obtained, the punishment been 
satisfied, and the offender rehabilitated, the existence of the record loses 
some of its justification.  The prosecutor appreciates attendant circumstances 
that surround contacts with the system and views it as his job to control for 
some of them if doing so will enable full restoration.  In practice, this means 
that prosecutors avoid delaying expungement by rarely objecting for 
frivolous procedural or substantive reasons, are willing to present a unified 
front to the judicial authority, and may even advocate for expungement.  
Regimes that allow for automatic expungement upon consent of the 
prosecutor implicitly seek to incentivize prosecutors to act as partners in 
rehabilitation, moving beyond the process-centric mentality of “plead ’em 
and forget.”211 
This approach, however, is not without its costs; it arguably eliminates 
stakeholders crucial to a well-functioning, legitimate postconviction remedy 
system.  First, well-meaning prosecutors might not act in accordance with the 
wishes of interested parties in particular situations, such as adequately 
accounting for the interests of victims who suffered as the result of a crime.  
Second, prosecutors who respond favorably to expungement also might 
underappreciate the inherent retributive component to a scarred reputation.  
It is not always the case that a scarred reputation is the same as a shattered 
one.  Some letters should remain stitched.  There are some instances where 
 
 209. See Commonwealth v. Wexler, 431 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. 1981).   
 210. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122(c) (2018).  
 211. In fairness, the origin of this phrase is “meet ’em, and plead ’em,” which usually 
appears in critiques of overburdened public defense programs. See CeCilia Valentine, Meet 
’Em and Plead ’Em:  Is This the Best Practice?, CHAMPION, June 2013, at 18, 
https://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=28953 [https://perma.cc/2KL9-YVXX].  The 
author’s conversations with local county prosecutors suggest that understanding the mechanics 
of the administration of justice after prosecution in a phase like expungement, and the negative 
effects of criminal records, is rarely an office priority, a hypothesis he is currently in the 
process of testing empirically.  
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keeping a criminal record public and accessible is wise.  Third, this approach 
might divide prosecutors’ offices internally by pitting the prosecutor who 
favors expungement against the institutional and personal investment of the 
prosecutor responsible for the otherwise legitimate conviction, or, in the case 
of nonconviction charges, the police.  Competing incentives can breed 
conflicts that can fester and undermine law enforcement efforts in other 
contexts. 
Mitigating the existence of criminal records or their effects also might not 
give enough deference to the information-exchange values of a free society.  
One of the major arguments against expungement is that it essentially 
perpetrates a lie on society by whitewashing the past.212  Free societies should 
not hide their pasts, even when they are not necessarily pleasant.213  And 
individuals who facilitate the sharing of accurate information about the 
criminal activities of others, according to this line of thinking, should be 
lauded rather than reprimanded.214  Political goals incentivize prosecutors to 
be mindful of this when considering expungement. 
That said, focusing on mitigation enables prosecutors to foster forgiveness 
and offer mercy when very few other institutions and actors within the system 
are doing so.215  They can help to alleviate basic inequities within the system 
that breed pent-up frustration among ex-offenders and other actors.  There 
are reasons to prioritize individualized legitimacy, including the 
postprosecution rights of the accused, over the presumed “tough on crime” 
interests of society.  Doing so implicitly keeps the onus on the state after 
prosecution, which is not the norm, but could help to build trust between 
prosecutors and communities.  It therefore accords with procedural justice 
concerns and seems to be consistent with the values underlying public 
policies in favor of expungement and other reentry projects. 
3.  Criminal Records Indifference 
Another possible approach involves prosecutorial inaction or, at most, 
half-hearted prosecutorial advocacy.  The motivation here is a belief that 
prosecutors are not agents of social change; they have a limited role that 
already demands significant resources—contributing to determinations of 
guilt and innocence.  Thus, prosecutors are justified in their indifference to 
the effect of criminal record history information because their focus should 
be on the primary aspect of their jobs—proving guilt by the end of trial (or 
negotiation).  Prosecutors focused exclusively on the law enforcement work 
of the office do not fully appreciate the effect of a criminal record after the 
direct punishment is complete.  But they also do not appreciate the depth of 
their involvement postprosecution, which makes their engagement in 
 
 212. Clay Calvert & Jerry Bruno, When Cleansing Criminal History Clashes with the First 
Amendment and Online Journalism:  Are Expungement Statutes Irrelevant in the Digital Age?, 
19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 123, 131–33 (2010). 
 213. Id.   
 214. Id.   
 215. Prosecutors already have incentives to do this when it will lead to the future 
cooperation of law enforcement.   
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expungement hearings an afterthought.  In practice, this means prosecutors 
defer to the wisdom of the judge and almost always engage in actions that 
bring expungement matters to the hearing stage, essentially punting to the 
judicial authority. 
Agnostic prosecutors tend to see both sides of the expungement debate but 
refrain from trying to preserve or mitigate the effect of criminal records.  
Instead, these offices adopt an ad hoc, unprepared approach to advocacy, 
which suggests a lack of policy commitment or resource constraints.  There 
is no predicting how the prosecutor might approach an expungement petition 
in this model, which of course can lead to selective and differential treatment 
for similarly situated individuals.  It also can undermine law enforcement 
objectives, fail to appreciate the procedural justice concerns of a community, 
and counteract the objectives of policymakers in other arenas. 
At face value, this approach has several disadvantages.  First, it adopts a 
callous attitude toward expungement remedies by automatically denying the 
significance of a criminal record.  This manifests itself in the lack of internal 
office policy or preparation for expungement.  Petitions may fall through the 
cracks and requests for consent by petitioners may fall on deaf ears or receive 
the polite response, “let’s see what the judge says.”  That leads to a second 
problem:  prosecutors refusing to perform part of their jobs by not 
contributing to the reform and redress of inequities within the system.  Third, 
prosecutors who are agnostic about the effect of a criminal record will likely 
not appreciate the gravity of their decisions in other contexts, such as the 
screening, charging, and charge-bargaining phases.  This model 
underappreciates the active, discretionary component inherent to the 
“minister of justice” label and instead has prosecutors resemble clerical 
actors. 
One might argue that an advantage of this model is that unbiased judges 
make decisions about expungement, thereby solidifying the judiciary as the 
final decision maker.  An unbiased determination is surely a noble goal.  
However, the nature of that determination is skewed by the lack of interest 
on the part of the prosecutor.  The prosecutor who does not actively seek to 
appreciate the reasons for and against expungement does not provide counsel 
to the judge making a particularized determination in an individual case.  She 
also might shirk her legislatively assigned duties under the statute.  Thus, the 
indifference model also has the potential to cause prosecutors to forget the 
importance of representing the interests of various stakeholders. 
Before proceeding to discuss how these models, and the existing statutes, 
relate to prevailing norms regarding the prosecutorial mindset and behavior, 
a few clarifications might be in order.  First, the discussion of the above 
approaches is by no means intended to close debate about the panoply of 
considerations that might drive a prosecutor’s response to the notion of 
expungement.  Instead, it aims to identify the general frameworks that guide 
prosecutorial decision-making in this arena, with mentions of incentives and 
motivations that comport with the objectives underlying those frameworks.  
These frameworks exist along a spectrum, so it is possible for hybrid 
approaches to exist.  Prosecutorial incentives are messy and expungement 
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regimes can help solidify some and not others, which results in mixed 
approaches in practice. 
Additionally, this Article does not make any claim about the prevalence of 
any of these approaches, or the range of considerations that might permeate 
them.  That is an empirical project for another day.  Still, deciphering the 
boundaries between these approaches and how expungement regimes foster 
them is analytically useful because it allows for evaluating prosecutorial 
action in the expungement phase against the backdrop of existing notions of 
prosecutorial responsibility.  Juxtaposing these approaches exposes how the 
current framework conceptualizing the prosecutor as “minister of justice”—
focused almost entirely on adjudication and determinations of 
blameworthiness—fails to adequately account for the complexities endemic 
to prosecutorial activity after the disposition.  Determining those 
shortcomings and proposing a response is the task of the next Part. 
C.  The Shortcomings of Existing Guidance 
Existing guidelines for prosecutorial discretion fall woefully short for 
phases after prosecution other than conviction-integrity review.  These 
shortcomings are largely the product of history, conservative approaches to 
the rules of professional responsibility, and ad hoc rulemaking by judicial 
authorities.  However, while those guidelines are insufficient, they also 
express certain normative commitments that are useful in constructing a 
theoretical framework for discretion in expungement. 
Prosecutors are often labeled “ministers of justice,”216 a phrase designed 
to encapsulate the double role assigned to prosecutors.  They are tasked with 
advocating within an adversarial system while simultaneously acting in the 
public interest.  The pursuit of justice as the primary mission dates back over 
150 years.217  Early courts described prosecutors as representatives of “the 
people” who advocate on behalf of the public interest.218  The U.S. Supreme 
Court solidified that understanding in Berger v. United States,219 which noted 
that the prosecutor is “the representative . . . of a sovereignty whose 
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern 
at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it 
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”220  Notably, the Court’s 
conception of the prosecutor as an impartial “minister of justice” who pursues 
convictions fairly does not consider the responsibilities of a prosecutor after 
prosecution. 
 
 216. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N, Discussion Draft 
1983).  
 217. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 94 (5th ed. 1907) (“The 
office of the Attorney-General is a public trust, which involves in the discharge of it, the 
exertion of an almost boundless discretion, by an officer who stands as impartial as a judge.”).   
 218. See, e.g., Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 404, 416 (1872) (“The prosecuting officer 
represents the public interest.”).   
 219. 295 U.S. 78 (1935). 
 220. Id. at 88.  
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Professional responsibility norms and rules have evolved over the past 
century to call for more oversight of prosecutorial behavior.  The American 
Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Rule 3.8 represents the latest iteration.  The 
provisions of the rule address five different areas, including conduct relating 
to the exercise of procedural rights by the accused, disclosure obligations, the 
investigative authority of prosecutors, and public communications and 
statements.221  The comments to Model Rule 3.8 label prosecutors “ministers 
of justice” with responsibilities extending beyond those “of an advocate.”222 
Other guidelines for prosecutorial behavior exist in the ABA’s criminal 
justice standards and the National District Attorneys Association’s (NDAA) 
National Prosecution Standards.  The ABA reiterates how “[t]he duty of the 
prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict,”223 and both guidelines 
go one step further than Model Rule 3.8 by labeling the prosecutor “an 
administrator of justice, an advocate, and an officer of the court.”224  The 
NDAA guidelines remark that the “primary responsibility of prosecution is 
to see that justice is accomplished.”225  The case law across jurisdictions has 
tended to support the “minister of justice” approach but in specific contexts 
and without elaboration on application to other prosecutorial activities.226  
The ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, association standards, and 
scattered cases combine to create a patchwork of guidelines that leave 
significant questions as to the discretion of individual prosecutors. 
In short, there is a chasm between theory and practice when it comes to 
regulating prosecutorial discretion.227  The rules are vague to begin with, and 
they fail to recognize the prosecutorial incentives that result from a 
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exculpatory evidence).   
 227. Medwed, supra note 181, at 36 (noting the “troubling disconnect between the 
‘minister of justice’ ideal of the American prosecutor and the on-the-streets reality of 
prosecutorial behavior”).   
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prosecutor’s bifurcated role.  Additionally, the bases for the rules themselves 
do not give adequate weight to the significant discretion afforded to 
prosecutors in lesser-known phases of a prosecution.  As one commentator 
puts it, “When the ABA advises prosecutors to act as ‘ministers of justice’ or 
‘administrators of justice,’ it is using juris-babble that is practically 
meaningless to prosecutors and to the ABA itself.”228 
The command to do justice is too vacuous and does not appreciate the 
complicated nature of the prosecutorial role, which is contingent on the 
setting in which the prosecutor is acting.229  Does “justice” mean procedural 
or substantive justice?  Do those phrases have different meanings in different 
settings?  Does the force of the obligation on the prosecutor depend on the 
viability and acceptability of other aspects of the criminal justice process?  
Does justice equal fairness?  Is pursuing fairness an affirmative duty in all 
settings or only during the trial phase?  In short, “doing justice” can lead a 
prosecutor in many directions before returning the prosecutor to where she 
started—her own judgment.230 
The existing guidelines leave significant room for interpretation in the 
hands of prosecutors.231  This leaves difficult questions, many not even 
contemplated by the terms of the rules or comments, unanswered.232  As 
mentioned above, these guidelines fail to consider the full range of 
responsibilities possessed by prosecutors.233  For purposes of this Article, it 
is worth pointing out how most, if not all, of the rules are designed to apply 
in situations when the prosecutor is clearly operating as an advocate and in 
venues designed to determine the defendant’s guilt.234  As a result, precise 
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guidance does not exist for situations not involving the guilt or innocence of 
the defendant. 
While academic literature has recognized the ambiguity in the 
constitutional and professional guidance, proposals in this realm have 
focused largely on guiding prosecutorial discretion before disposition.  
Scholars have sought to illuminate and justify the factors behind legitimate 
charging and bargaining,235 and they have justified prosecutorial regulation 
in the trial context when adversarial safeguards are no longer present.236  
Additionally, scholars have focused on articulating the line between the 
investigative and adjudicative aspects of the position to mitigate bias in the 
adjudicative responsibilities of the job.237  That examination led to Professor 
Barkow’s proposal, for example, to call for a check on the adjudicatory 
decision-making of prosecutors through institutional design.238 
In particular, Professor Barkow’s proposals for institutional design focus 
on determining which tasks are investigative and which are adjudicative.239  
Investigative tasks are those that precede the initiation of charges, although 
they retain an adjudicative component given the effect of charges.240  
Adjudicative tasks “capture those decisions that effectively amount to a 
decision on the merits about a defendant’s guilt and what punishment he or 
she deserves.”241  However, expungement relates to both sides of the line, 
depending on the type of criminal record history information at issue.  
Expungement implicates the investigative side because law enforcement 
might find a use for the information in the future.  But it also implicates the 
adjudicative side because while the guilt and innocence phase has passed, the 
merits of mitigating the arguably punitive effect of a criminal record remain 
an issue.  The prosecutor must ask whether the continued existence of a 
record, as punishment, is justified.  While informative, the structural proposal 
that provides a clean break between the investigative and adjudicative sides 
does not neatly answer that question.  Further, it is not entirely clear that it is 
viable in state prosecutors’ offices—often divided politically by county—and 
without the resources of a large, federal bureaucracy.242  Decentralization 
makes clarity even more difficult and the need for it that much greater.243 
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III.  TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROSECUTORIAL ROLE 
DURING EXPUNGEMENT 
After discussing the unique challenges posed by regulating the 
expungement process and the failure of existing academic literature to 
address it, this Part endeavors to propose a resolution.  Part III.A begins with 
a discussion of the various justifications for improving regulation of the 
prosecutorial role in expungement proceedings.  Part III.B draws on these 
justifications and understandings of prosecutorial incentives to offer concrete 
proposals for reform. 
A.  “Ministers of Justice” After Prosecution 
Although existing guidelines are imperfect, scholars typically justify any 
call for prosecutorial justice by pointing to either the immense power 
afforded prosecutors or the uniqueness of their role.244  These justifications 
offer useful parameters for considering the nature of prosecutorial 
responsibility in the expungement context because the aforementioned 
statutory regimes leave room for prosecutors to act as advocates and quasi-
judicially.245  Understanding the justification for pursuing justice is helpful 
for constructing a framework in the expungement context, where discretion 
must account less for individual blameworthiness and more for a balancing 
of broad, diffuse state objectives with the merits of the individual petition. 
The “minister of justice” ideal rests on the following premises:  
(1) prosecutors engage in atypical legal work when they employ the power 
of law enforcement institutions; (2) prosecutors have different legal 
obligations than other attorneys; and (3) the historical basis for the 
prosecutorial office is unique.246  Building from these premises, there are two 
justifications for asking prosecutors to pursue justice:  the power afforded 
prosecutors and their role as the sovereign’s representative.  The first 
justification emphasizes how the prosecutor, as a powerful agent of the state, 
faces generally powerless defendants in an adversarial setting.  The authority 
possessed by prosecutors and resource advantages require prosecutors to be 
mindful of goals other than achieving convictions.  This mindfulness should 
 
Nonetheless, there are a number of state district attorneys’ offices that serve as models of 
prosecutorial constitutionalism.”).   
 244. Green, supra note 221, at 1576.   
 245. See supra Parts II.A–B.  
 246. Green, supra note 221, at 1577 (“In the case of a criminal prosecution, in contrast, the 
prosecutor is not only a lawyer for the government but also a government official who makes 
the decisions on behalf of the government that would ordinarily be made by the client.  Further, 
the prosecutor makes these and other decisions in light of various government objectives that 
derive from the law and legal traditions and that differ from the ordinary objectives of private 
clients.  The government’s objectives might include not only convicting and punishing 
individuals who commit crimes, but also assuring fair and proportional punishment of the 
guilty, protecting the innocent from punishment, assuring fair treatment of those affected by 
the criminal process, and assuring compliance with constitutional and other legal provisions 
regulating criminal investigations and prosecutions.  The prosecutor’s distinctive role, that is 
captured by the characterization of the prosecutor as a ‘minister of justice,’ leads to distinctive 
professional expectations, which are summed up by the duty to ‘seek justice.’”).   
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check the temptations that power might foster if left to its own devices.  This 
justification underlies theories of prosecutorial ethics during phases 
involving the guilt or innocence of a defendant, especially at trial.247 
The second justification stems from the prosecutor’s role as the 
sovereign’s representative.248  Under this form of analysis, the prosecutor 
represents a sovereign who delegates authority to make decisions normally 
entrusted to the client.  This means, in practice, that the prosecutor is tasked 
with deciphering the state’s (client’s) objectives and pursuing them.  Hence, 
the prosecutor functions quasi-judicially by serving as both lawyer and 
government representative: 
In many situations, a question of prosecutorial ethics will relate not to the 
prosecutor’s duties as the government’s trial lawyer, but to the prosecutor’s 
fiduciary duties as the government’s decisionmaking representative.  In this 
role, as would be true of any individual acting as a fiduciary on behalf of a 
client, the prosecutor must make decisions and otherwise act in accordance 
with the client’s interests and objectives.249 
In the criminal law context, the aims of the sovereign state are threefold:  
(1) convicting guilty persons and avoiding prosecution of the innocent; 
(2) treating individuals with proportionality; and (3) treating lawbreakers 
equally.250  The last two implicate expungement. 
Both justifications can inform the construction of a theoretical framework 
for the exercise of discretion in the expungement context, although neither is 
adequate given the variation in prosecutorial involvement at the state level.  
The first justification corresponds to the power that prosecutors possess 
procedurally and substantively in the expungement context.  In several 
jurisdictions, prosecutors have the ability to grant or deny expungement 
petitions in their entirety or to determine whether the process will be delayed, 
requires judicial intervention, or needs to be repeated at a later date.251  That 
power, left to prosecutors without check, can be abused intentionally or due 
to lack of appreciation for the stigma associated with criminal records.252  As 
such, some modicum of regulation is necessary to ensure that prosecutors use 
the power wisely; otherwise the imbalance of power that exists from charging 
to sentencing is exacerbated after prosecution, given the deleterious effect of 
a criminal record.  However, the power justification alone does not capture 
the prosecutorial function during expungement because prosecutors are not 
asked to simply ensure fair procedure.  Rather, expungement regimes tend to 
 
 247. See Green, supra note 230, at 629; Zacharias, supra note 31, at 50–56. 
 248. Green, supra note 230, at 633 (“A lawyer serving in the role as criminal prosecutor is 
distinguished by the identity of the client, the amount of authority delegated to the lawyer to 
act on behalf of the client and the nature of the client’s interests and ends in the criminal 
context.”).   
 249. Id. at 634.   
 250. Id.  
 251. See supra Part II.A.  
 252. Eric Fish makes a similar argument with respect to constitutional rights controlled by 
prosecutors. See Fish, supra note 34, at 299 (“Prosecutors should protect defendants’ 
constitutional rights in those stages of the criminal justice process that prosecutors unilaterally 
control . . . [and] adopt judge-role ethics.”).   
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provide prosecutors with a responsibility to articulate the position of the state 
and, in some instances, actually enforce it. 
Thus, the idea of the prosecutor as the sovereign’s representative can 
inform behavior in the expungement context.  First, the expungement context 
is not as adversarial as the trial phase.  Second, determining the defendant’s 
blameworthiness is no longer the fundamental objective of the process; 
rather, the defendant’s eligibility and rehabilitation are fundamental to the 
determination.  Third, the defendant’s interests must be balanced against the 
range of concerns articulated in the preservation model outlined above, which 
means that the prosecutor is expected to account for an array of state interests.  
And some align with the objectives of the defendant and some do not.  For 
example, will allowing for expungement send the wrong message to the 
public and other law enforcement actors, assuming the prosecutor can 
decipher the state’s overall objectives and how they should be applied in 
particular cases?  Alternatively, how does a prosecutor respond to the fact 
that background-check clearance can reduce recidivism?253  Finally, the 
statute driving the proceeding is not a prohibition; rather, it is a cause of 
action providing relief.  The very existence of an expungement regime 
suggests a conception of justice that leaves room for mercy.  All of these 
considerations amplify the nature of the quasi-judicial role during 
expungement proceedings. 
Because expungement proceedings are not as intrinsically adversarial as 
other phases, nor as focused on determining culpability, the prosecutor more 
often than not functions quasi-judicially.  When evaluating an expungement 
petition, the prosecutor is essentially acting as a court of first review.  
Evaluation of what to do with the disposition now hinges on eligibility and 
the character of the ex-offender (or arrestee) rather than just the 
blameworthiness of the defendant, which has already been adjudicated.  
Notions of mercy become relevant because the prosecutor’s obligation to do 
justice requires considering whether forgiveness is warranted. 
Put simply, the theoretical framework for exercising prosecutorial 
discretion in the expungement context must account for the reality that 
existing expungement regimes situate prosecutors in a quasi-judicial role.  In 
this role, a prosecutor’s concerns relate less to individual blameworthiness 
and more toward a balancing of broad, diffuse state objectives with the merits 
of the individual petition.  Those objectives are clearer in some situations 
than others but their spirit is undeniable—providing an avenue for relief for 
worthy ex-offenders that allows the prosecutor and the state to move beyond 
resentment and punishment.254  As such, the quasi-judicial role of 
prosecutors during this phase arguably imports mercy into any conception of 
pursuing justice. 
Existing expungement regimes provide prosecutors with the capacity 
essentially to gift warranted relief to worthy ex-offenders.  It is important to 
distinguish this from full-fledged forgiveness, which involves more work on 
 
 253. See generally Denver et al., supra note 4.   
 254. Bibas, supra note 112, at 331.   
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the prosecutor’s end.255  Rather, mercy in the expungement context involves 
careful consideration of the effects of expungement on the path of the ex-
offender.  And this is mercy that would essentially act to stop additional 
punishment from being exacted by the existence of a criminal record.256 
It is not difficult to imagine scenarios where mercy might be warranted.  
There are plenty of offenses that were once considered serious that have since 
been decriminalized and examples of abuses in policing that have led to arrest 
records.257  The rehabilitation of a defendant also can justify mercy.  And the 
collateral consequences of a conviction or arrest might justify mercy as well.  
As such, in the expungement context, a prosecutor might be faced with a 
decision about whether pursuing justice actually means taking affirmative 
action on behalf of a defendant,258 in conjunction with the objectives of the 
state, the spirit underlying the statute, and justice overall.  At the same time, 
as quasi-judicial actors, prosecutors must remain mindful of the limitations 
placed upon both them and petitioners seeking relief.  Mercy is not warranted 
in every instance because justice demands otherwise. 
In sum, “doing justice” in the expungement context first means taking 
ownership of the prosecutorial role as quasi-judicial rather than a matter of 
strict advocacy.  The statutory regimes provide as much, and the nature of 
the proceeding reinforces that role.  Second, being a quasi judge in this 
context means that prosecutors, on a macro level, must decipher the 
objectives and policies of the state when it comes to expungement relief.  In 
fairness, while the existence of expungement relief itself suggests some 
objectives, states could be clearer as to the priorities they envision for 
prosecutors.  But one of those objectives is certainly reducing recidivism, 
which clear background checks help to do.259  Third, after determining all of 
the objectives, prosecutors must strive to properly balance all of the 
competing considerations and do so in a manner that respects proportionality 
principles and ensures that similarly situated defendants receive the same 
treatment.  Additionally, prosecutors need to consider thoroughly whether 
expungement is necessary to mitigate unintentional results from a disposition 
that were not part of the direct sentence, even if the results could have been 
justified at an earlier time in the defendant’s history.  Particularized 
determinations should be normal in this regard.  Finally, prosecutors must 
recognize how existing expungement regimes provide the opportunity to 
pursue justice mindful of mercy.  Recognition of that awesome capacity, 
 
 255. Id. at 332 (“Unlike forgiveness, which flows from an internal emotional 
transformation, mercy is an external gift to a wrongdoer.”).   
 256. The default position for prosecutors in all phases relating to guilt and innocence is 
“doing justice.” Zacharias, supra note 14, at 173.  For expungement proceedings related to 
nonconviction charges or involving a defendant who has satisfied all of the elements of his 
direct sentence, shouldn’t the default position be justice mindful of mercy? 
 257. See, e.g., The Spread of Marijuana Legalization, Explained, VOX (Mar. 18, 2018, 9:09 
AM), https://www.vox.com/cards/marijuana-legalization/what-is-marijuana-
decriminalization [https://perma.cc/WJP5-SHA6]. 
 258. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 182. 
 259. See generally Denver et al., supra note 4. 
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which for too long has only been understood as part of the pardon power, 
demands an appropriate response. 
B.  Proposals 
This Part offers a few concrete suggestions to help prosecutors act in a 
fashion that pursues justice on a macro and micro level.  It begins with a 
discussion of institutional changes within prosecutors’ offices and then 
moves on to suggest legislative reforms. 
1.  The Prosecutorial Mindset and Institutional Design 
Exercising discretion in the expungement context involves conflicting 
interests.  Individual prosecutors may feel as though supporting expungement 
undoes significant investment by themselves or their colleagues.  They may 
also feel the weight of expectations from other stakeholders, including 
victims, law enforcement personnel, defendants, and the state itself.  The 
state can send mixed messages depending on whether the public policy 
underlying the expungement regime has been made clear.  Finally, individual 
prosecutors might find themselves in an office with divergent policy goals 
and inattention to the importance of expungement.  Thus, the first step to 
ensuring the fair exercise of prosecutorial discretion is to recognize these 
conflicts and mitigate their ability to paralyze decision-making or lead to a 
default position against expungement.260 
One way to counter some of these conflicts is to separate the adversarial 
and quasi-judicial functions within a prosecutor’s office.  In other words, 
offices might clearly mandate a prosecutor, when determining the merits of 
an expungement petition, to be mindful of her quasi-judicial role.261  For such 
a measure to be effective, it must occur at the policy level within the office 
and through educational measures that inform prosecutors about both the 
effects of a criminal record on reentry and the purposes of expungement 
relief.  Others have commented on creating detailed protocols in the 
postconviction review context,262 and there is no reason why similar internal 
procedures, or creation of a differential for prosecutors to think through, 
cannot exist with respect to expungement proceedings.  This will operate to 
mitigate arbitrariness in decision-making. 
 
 260. See Zacharias, supra note 14, at 218 (“At the postconviction stage, in contrast, 
prosecutors may not recognize the conflicts as readily because the various constituencies 
ordinarily are less active, may be unrepresented, and may not even know that an issue exists.  
As a procedural matter, this means that the judgment of prosecutors often will be clouded with 
their recognizing the possibility of a conflict of interest.  This, in turn, may lead them to rely 
too much on the presumption of guilt as a means for justifying inaction.”).   
 261. See H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor:  The Obligation of Dispassion in a 
Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1716 (2000).  While Eric Fish has proposed 
something similar in his article entitled “Prosecutorial Constitutionalism,” his proposal is 
confined to the phases of prosecution before disposition. See generally Fish, supra note 34.  
 262. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 238 (“[P]rosecutors’ offices should highlight 
postconviction justice issues in their manuals and administrative guidelines.  At a minimum, 
internal guidelines can accomplish as much as new code provisions in establishing principles 
governing the presumption of guilt and the legitimacy of specific questionable criteria.”).   
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Another measure that could help to ensure consistency is the development 
of a clear office policy on expungement.  Many offices treat expungement 
proceedings as items on the miscellaneous docket.  But given the complexity 
of exercising discretion in this area, prosecutors need to carefully reflect on 
how they want line personnel to respond to these petitions.  Ad hoc decision-
making cannot be the norm because it too easily incentivizes a default posture 
that is adversarial and forsakes the holistic responsibility at this phase. 
In terms of office structure, offices should ensure that the prosecutor 
assessing the merits of a petition—both procedurally and substantively—is 
not the same prosecutor who prosecuted the case.  The temptation to oppose 
expungement by default is too great.  Prosecutors might have emotional 
attachments to their prior work, thereby clouding judgment.  Prosecutors also 
might fear appearing soft to defendants, judges, victims, and their colleagues.  
In practice, this could involve the creation of a separate unit—similar to 
charging or diversion-eligibility units—that deals only with postconviction 
remedies, or simply expungement.  Coupled with a clear office policy, 
prosecutors could rotate through the unit to ensure that the preferences of one 
prosecutor do not become de facto policy and to expose prosecutors to the 
arguments about the effects of a criminal record.  This, in turn, would allow 
for careful reflection by prosecutors when they return to predisposition work 
about the long-term effects of a disposition. 
Alternatively, prosecutors might consider hiring special expungement 
prosecutors with no prior experience as a prosecutor.  This person also could 
be a senior prosecutor who no longer is involved in the adjudication of 
cases.263  Such a position could recognize from the start the quasi-judicial 
nature of the task.  The hired prosecutor might be required to consult with a 
citizen panel periodically to gauge the community’s sense of when 
expungement is worthwhile. 
Finally, offices should strive to appreciate that the expungement phase is 
no longer primarily about blameworthiness.  The culpability of the defendant 
has already been adjudicated in almost all situations before a petition for 
expungement is filed.  In the case of an arrest, prosecutors should not use 
expungement proceedings as an opportunity to simply restate probable cause 
as the justification for retaining a record.  In this sense, prosecutors can 
recognize that their primary function—determining blameworthiness—is 
over and that the system has produced a disposition, however uncomfortable 
the prosecutor is with it.  Now it is the defendant’s chance to demonstrate 
rehabilitation and the prosecutor’s opportunity to contribute to mercy on the 
path to restoration.  Alternatively, it is a chance for the prosecutor to take 
seriously the expectations of other stakeholders arguing against 
 
 263. Of course, the risks of making this individual a senior prosecutor should be apparent:  
experience or age is by no means a cure for the conviction mindset mentioned above.  In fact, 
it could make biased decision-making worse because the senior prosecutor does not want to 
be perceived as undoing the work of her colleagues and is invested in the conviction record of 
the office. See Barkow, supra note 31, at 904 (“Indeed, it is possible that individuals with a 
great deal of experience may be biased precisely because their time in the office has colored 
their judgment.”).   
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expungement.  Part of this mindset involves recognizing that contributing to 
restoration is not necessarily undermining retribution.  Instead, expungement 
has the capacity to ensure proportionality—one of the main objectives of 
every prosecutor. 
2.  Legislative Clarity 
Legislatures and policymakers, as well as the ABA—through its rules of 
professional responsibility—also can help prosecutors to responsibly act in 
this setting.  First, legislative reforms aimed at clarifying the prosecutorial 
role and standards of review throughout the expungement process should 
properly situate prosecutorial decision-making within the overall 
expungement setting.  Second, the terms of Model Rule 3.8, or at least its 
comments, need to consider how discretionary decisions related to reentry 
connect to the call for prosecutors to seek justice. 
Two legislative reforms would be particularly useful.  First, legislatures 
need to provide clarity, beyond the language of the statute, regarding the 
state’s objectives with respect to expungement.  Second, legislatures can 
create clearer standards of review during the prosecutorial review phase and 
the judicial review phase to account for natural prosecutorial incentives that 
might cause prosecutors to view expungement skeptically. 
Statutes need to clearly articulate the grounds for prosecutorial opposition 
to expungement.  Some statutes already provide procedural reasons for 
objection.264  Very few reference legitimate grounds for substantive 
objections.265  Instead, statutes reference the power to object and its effect 
but do not indicate to prosecutors why objection might be justified.  While 
statutes cannot predict every circumstance or potential reason for opposition 
to a petition, they can at least articulate the public policy for doing so.  They 
could also mandate that prosecutors consult with community panels within 
their jurisdictions in order to gauge when the community thinks expungement 
is appropriate.  This way, prosecutors would not be acting in the dark when 
it comes to deciphering and representing the objectives of the state, which is 
necessary to properly act quasi-judicially.  An expungement statute that does 
not provide guidance in this area essentially asks a prosecutor to represent a 
silent client. 
Expungement regimes also need to clarify the standards of review for 
prosecutorial and judicial review of petitions.  Procedurally meritorious 
expungement petitions—that is, those that involve a disposition that is 
definitively eligible for expungement—should be assessed within a paradigm 
that contemplates mercy as part of justice.  Most expungement statutes 
involve an even balancing of interests.  But the near-universal negative effect 
of a criminal record should tilt the ledger in favor of the ex-offender.266  
 
 264. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-37(n)(2) (West 2018). 
 265. See supra Part II.A.  
 266. Interestingly, Nevada recently passed legislation allowing for a presumption in favor 
of sealing “if all statutory eligibility criteria are satisfied” and permitting judicial grants of 
sealing petitions if the prosecutor agrees. See Mayson, supra note 89, at 13.  Montana also 
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Justifying retention of the record should be a higher burden than justification 
for expungement, especially given that most expungement or shielding 
statutes allow closed-door retention for selective purposes in the future, such 
as law enforcement efforts.267  Standards of review need to reflect the reality 
that, in the vast majority of cases, expungement will not disturb the activities 
of the state designed to protect individuals. 
In addition to modified standards of review, legislatures would be wise to 
emphasize that the judiciary or an intermediate, administrative reviewing 
body, is, in all situations, the final decision maker when it comes to 
expungement.268  This holds for both the procedural and substantive review 
of expungement petitions.  Too many statutes allow prosecutorial objections 
to significantly stall or terminate the expungement process by acting as 
gatekeepers, which can chill petitioners.  Alternatively, legislatures might 
consider enacting expiration dates for criminal records to counteract 
unnecessarily hostile prosecutors and judges, or inaction by both parties that 
effectively prevents expungement.269 
In terms of professional responsibility, Model Rule 3.8, the ABA criminal 
justice standards, and the NDAA’s National Prosecution Standards need to 
recognize that prosecutorial discretion exists in areas of the criminal justice 
system beyond the culpability phase.  The shadows are dark in the corners of 
the system that are only tangentially related to determinations of guilt and 
innocence.  Neither Model Rule 3.8 nor its comments consider the range of 
decisions that prosecutors make without guidance.  This is likely because the 
drafters of these rules were focused solely on pursuing convictions at trial or 
during plea negotiations.  Yet prosecutors make countless decisions relating 
to a prosecution after it is complete every day. 
A modified Model Rule 3.8 would include a discussion of the various 
realms in which prosecutors can act simultaneously to serve the range of 
objectives of the state and to mitigate the long-term effect of a criminal 
record.  Model Rule 3.8(a) currently instructs prosecutors to “refrain from 
prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable 
cause.”270  Why not consider that opposition to expungement for 
nonconviction charges that will not be prosecuted—either for probable cause 
reasons or others—violates the spirit of this provision? 
Comment one to Model Rule 3.8 also mentions that “[c]ompetent 
representation of the sovereignty may require a prosecutor to undertake some 
procedural and remedial measures as a matter of obligation.”271  While this 
comment comes on the heels of a discussion of conviction review for 
innocent persons, the same principle arguably applies in the expungement 
 
seemed to enact a similar presumption unless the petitioner has other convictions. MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 46-18-1101(3) (West 2017).   
 267. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122(c) (2018).   
 268. If a state assigned review to an administrative panel by way of either a parole hearing 
or pardon boards, the judiciary should still remain as a forum of last resort given the 
constitutional interests articulated above.  
 269. Of course, this style of regulatory solution would need to pass constitutional muster.  
 270. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N, Discussion Draft 1983). 
 271. Id. cmt. 1. 
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context given the effect of a criminal record.  In order to competently 
advocate for the state, the prosecutor may need to undo a conviction or arrest 
to guarantee the remedy afforded by the state.  That is a paradox that is 
difficult to comprehend without additional guidance. 
Additionally, Model Rule 3.8 could contain language about the unique set 
of interests presented after prosecution.  It could articulate the range of 
considerations surrounding a petition for relief like expungement, including 
the needs of the defendant, the expectations of other stakeholders, First 
Amendment values, the accessibility of the information, law enforcement 
needs, the defendant’s rehabilitation, and the effect of granting an 
expungement for the state and the defendant.  Bringing additional language 
into Model Rule 3.8 may be criticized as overbearing, but the current lack of 
guidance breeds an arbitrariness that can truly undermine broader public 
policy objectives designed to better the system. 
  CONCLUSION 
When the judicial gavel confirms the disposition of charges, prosecutorial 
discretion does not cease.  Given the unquestionably negative effect of a 
criminal record and the limited remedies afforded an arrestee or ex-offender 
postconviction, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion after completion of a 
prosecution is at least as significant as the exercise of judgment during other 
phases. 
For too long, examinations of prosecutorial discretion have focused on 
what happens in the shadows of the law for the phases before disposition.  
Modern-day analyses of prosecutorial decision-making focus almost entirely 
on the mindset of prosecutors during the charging, bargaining, and sentencing 
phases.  The proposals created for those phases do not fully account for the 
complexity of the prosecutorial response to expungement.  To be fair, many 
of the incentives driving prosecutorial decision-making remain in the 
expungement realm.  But the power afforded to prosecutors, the uniqueness 
of the remedy, the mixed messages sent by states affording the remedy, and 
the indirect connection between expungement and the investigative and 
adjudicative aspects of the criminal process combine to leave prosecutors in 
the dark.  Neither the law nor the professional responsibility guidelines 
clarify what prosecutors should prioritize in this arena.  And in a time when 
criminal record history information is widely retained and published, the 
decisions of prosecutors are crucial. 
Responding to expungement petitions is a responsibility of the everyday 
prosecutor across state jurisdictions.  And considering the negative effect of 
a criminal record, it is most definitely a “special” one.  Put simply, 
expungement matters, and prosecutors have a significant role to play in its 
availability as a remedy for offenders struggling to overcome barriers after 
their formal punishment has long ended.  Any account of prosecutorial action 
in this area must comprehend that expungement implicates a host of interests 
not fully present throughout the phases before disposition.  This panoply of 
concerns must force prosecutors to think beyond their roles as advocates in 
order to fully grasp the quasi-judicial nature of the position. 
